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Résumé 
 
La présente étude traite du conflit d’intérêts qui constitue les situations où l’assistance humanitaire se voit 
empêchée d’être fournie dans un conflict armé de caractère non-international à une population civile en détresse 
puisque l’Etat sur le territoire duquel se trouve cette population refuse une telle livraison en invoquant sa 
souveraineté. 
 
En cherchant de l’orientation aux sources du droit international humanitaire, cet essai fait face au fait que 
celles-ci n’offrent aucune réponse claire à propos de cet enjeu. D’un côté, les termes de l’article 18 du Protocole 
II stipulent clairement que l’aide ne puisse pas être distribuée contre le gré des belligérants. Ceci est promu par 
le fait que des Etats semblent tenir à la notion de souveraineté. De l’autre côté, d’après l’interprétation de cet 
article par la CIRC, une autorité responsable ne peut pas arbitrairement refuser d’octroyer la distribution de 
l’aide sur son territoire. En plus, la communauté internationale a réagi pour que l’on fournisse de l’assistance 
humanitaire. Il est clair, cependant, qu’un refus à l’assistance humanitaire puisse faire partie de l’actus reus 
d’un acte criminel international, comme par exemple, le crime contre l’humanité que constitue l’extermination. 
 
Ayant analysé l’état du droit international humanitaire en cette matière de façon critique, cet essai est plutôt 
attiré par l’enforcement de l’aide humanitaire, tenant compte que cette dernière constitue l’aspect réel du conflit 
d’intérêts présenté ci-haut. 
 
En traitant de l’implementation de l’aide humanitaire de deux angles différents, l’un d’agents et l’autre de 
manières potentielles pour l’effectuer, l’avis est soutenu qu’il importe de ne pas laisser tomber la souveraineté 
étatique à la légère, mais plutôt de la garder sous des formes d’aujourd’hui, soumise aux organismes 
pacifiques internationaux concernant certains domaines. Car l’enforcement de l’assistance humanitaire 
comporte, en dernier recours, l’usage de la force, sous forme de sanctions ou de force armée. Ceci, conjointement 
au fait que les pouvoirs majeurs militaires, économiques et politiques ne semblent pas hésiter à exploiter les 
incertitudes au sein du droit international décrites ci-haut, résulte au risque que l’aide humanitaire voile la 
promotion des intérêts nationaux. 
 
Afin d’éviter l’abus de l’assistance humanitaire à des fins clandestines, il est impératif que des règles claires 
soient élaborées et qu’une révision des provisions applicables au Conseil de Sécurité soit mise en œuvre en ce 
qui concerne par qui et sous quelles circonstances l’aide peut être enforcée en absence du consentement de l’Etat 
affecté. Il est suggéré de considérer un rôle consultatif de la Cour Pénale Internationale auprès du Conseil de 
Sécurité en entreprenant ce processus. Cette dernière proposition aboutirait à une clarté légale qui, à son tour, 
diminuera les possibilités d’abuser de l’assistance humanitaire. 
 
Cet essai soutient l’opinion que le Conseil de Sécurité devrait garder la responsabilité ultime de prendre toutes 
les décisions portant à l’emploi de force. En ayant épuisé tous les moyens non-violents pour distribuer l’aide 
humanitaire, la première mesure de force ainsi considerée devrait être des sanctions ciblées, c’est-à-dire adaptées 
spécifiquement pour affecter exclusivement l’autorité responsable et élaborées pour être moins nuisibles à la 
population civile. 
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Scope of essay 
 
The fundamental question upon which the argumentation in the present study is based is 
that of State sovereignty versus the relief of civilian people necessary for their survival in 
cases of non-international armed conflict. Are authorities in such conflicts free to refuse 
humanitarian assistance to be delivered on their territory? 
 
Subject to the limitations of this matter presented below, this paper will elaborate on the 
question primarily from two angles: Part One will give a theoretical overview of provisions 
of international humanitarian law (IHL) relevant to the subject; and Part Two will treat the 
issue practically by the way of a critical discussion on the enforcement of humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
i) When examining the different sources of IHL, the body of rules concerning international 
armed conflicts appears very elaborate in contrast to its equivalent for non-international 
armed conflicts. Generally, the protection afforded by Art 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions1 (GCI, GCII, GCII and GCIV or GCs together) cannot be compared with that 
given by the imposing body of rules applicable to international armed conflicts2, (the GCs 
with Additional Protocols contain close to 600 articles of which only 29 apply to internal 
conflicts3). As for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court4 (the Rome Statute), 
it refers to the GCs. Particularly, Art 70 of Additional Protocol I5 (API) questions States’ 
absolute discretion in approving humanitarian assistance in a far more pronounced manner 
                                                 
1 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces on the 
Field, August 12, 1949 (GCI); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949 (GCII); Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 (GCIII) and; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons on Time of War, August 12, 1949, (GCIV), UNTS, vol.75 no.970-973 
2 Denise Plattner, ”Assistance to the Civilian Population: The Development and Present State of International 
Humanitarian Law”, Int’l Review of the Red Cross, no.288, p.249-263, 1992 at p.257. 
3 S. Boelaert-Suominen, ”Grave Breaches, Universal Jurisdiction and Internal Armed Conflict: Is Customary 
Law Moving Towards A Uniform Enforcement Mechanism for all Armed Conflicts?”, Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law, Vol. 5, No.63, 2000, at section 5, footnote 31 
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, (in force July 1, 2002). 
5 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, June 8, 1977, UNTS vol.1125 no.17512 
than its equivalent for non-international conflicts, namely Art 18 of Additional Protocol II6 
(APII). Neither the Genocide Convention7 nor Art 7 of the Rome Statute codifying crimes 
against humanity distinguishes between international and non-international conflicts. 
 
An evaluation of the state of IHL concerning humanitarian assistance in non-international 
armed conflicts thus appears legally challenging. All the more, this becomes true when 
considering the increasing number of civil wars at the end of the last century. 
 
ii) A general right for people in dire need to receive humanitarian assistance is naturally a 
sympathetic notion. However, its actual realization in all situations were it would emerge 
seems very distant in today’s state of world affairs. In any case, a pursuit of its existence 
would be better placed within a discussion on economical and social human rights, than 
through interpretation of IHL. A right to give humanitarian assistance or an obligation for a 
State to receive it, on the other hand, appears better suited for a humanitarian law approach. 
 
Being predominantly concerned with IHL, this paper will avoid when possible the discussion 
of a potential human right to humanitarian assistance. Still, adjacent paradigms of 
international law will be considered when it serves the purpose of this study. 
 
iii) For a right to give humanitarian assistance, and an obligation upon an affected State to 
accept that it be distributed on its territory, not to be a hypothetic utopia, manners of 
enforcing the delivery of the aid come into play. Different incitements ranging from purely 
pacific means, e.g. international diplomatic pressure, over the imposing of sanctions, to 
ultimately the use of force may be deployed in order to extract consent to the distribution of 
humanitarian aid from the concerned State. In this context, especially as concerns armed 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance, issues similar to those in connection with the 
concept of humanitarian intervention could emerge. However, one would have to proceed 
with caution within the borderline between the enforcement of humanitarian assistance and 
humanitarian intervention: whereas the former solely aims at the physical distribution of 
                                                 
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, June 8, 1977, UNTS vol.1125 no.17513 
7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 8, 1948, UNTS vol.78 
no.277. 
medicines, foodstuffs and other materials essential for the survival of individuals, the latter 
may also constitute a reaction to serious human rights abuses and thus in a more 
pronounced manner come to target also the political power of a territory as such. It is 
nevertheless clear that the enforcement of humanitarian aid and humanitarian intervention 
entail similar questions, e.g. the one of misuse. 
 
While the issue of enforcement of humanitarian assistance thus is essential, considerable 
emphasis will be put into the different aspects of it, as well as into different routes of 
enforcement. However, the present study will not embark on the long-discussed issue of 
right to humanitarian intervention as such, but merely focus on the enforcement of 
humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, it would be rather pusillanimous to dodge the evident 
proximity between or the inter-twining of the two subjects, as well as the lessons that can be 
learned by one from the other in relevant parts.  
 
Introduction 
 
If there had been enough assistance to collect the wounded in the plains of Medola and from the bottom of the 
ravines of San Martino, on the sharp slopes of Mount Fontana, or on the low hills above Solferino, how 
different things would have been!  There would have been none of those long hours of waiting on June 24, 
hours of poignant anguish and bitter helplessness, during which those poor men of the Bersagliere, Uhlans and 
Zouaves struggled to rise, despite their fearful pain, and beckoned vainly for a letter to be brought over to 
them, and there would never have been the terrible possibility of what only too probably happened the next day 
– living men being buried among the dead!8 
 
* 
 
In 1960, the independent State of Somalia emerged from colonial rule as British and Italian 
Somali territories joined. From the 21st of October 1969, when he seized power through a 
coup d’état, up until 1991, General Mohamed Siad Barre ruled the country as a dictator. 
Somalia sides with other numerous third-world countries as a hot spot of the Cold War. In 
the 1970s, having formerly backed Mogadishu, the Soviet Union switched its support to the 
revolutionaries who had overthrown Haile Selassie in Ethiopia9. From November 1977 to 
February 1978 Soviet and Cuba provided military support to evict Barre’s troops from the 
Ogaden region in Ethiopia which Somalia had invaded in late summer 197710. In response to 
this support, the USA tacitly put Somalia in the Western camp as the Carter administration 
charged the Soviet Union with employing Cuban proxy forces to expand its interests in 
Africa11. 
 
                                                 
8 Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino, 1862. Dunant, the founding father of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), appalled by the atrocities embedding the soldiers of the clash of Austrian and Franco-
Sardinian forces during the War of Italian Unification in 1859, wrote this book in which he called for what was 
later to become the International Red Cross. Although his pity in this instance was for the suffering of the 
combatants, it still bears on the mayhem of human lives as such, and the call is one for human pathos in times 
of war in general. 
9 Martin Walker, The Cold War: A History, New York, 1995, p.238 
10 James G. Hershberg, Anatomy of a Third World Cold War Crisis: New East-Bloc Evidence on the Horn of Africa, 
1977-1978, available at: www.gwu.edu/˜nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a5.htm , visited on 10 January 
2004. 
11 Ibid. 
Barre’s military dictatorial rule provoked armed opposition movements and in 1990 internal 
hostilities began in the country, driving Barre out of power but not from the thus ignited 
civil war. From the United Somali Congress (USC) fractioned the Somali National Alliance 
(SNA), the former led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the latter by Mohamed Farah Aideed. 
There were then three parties to the internal conflict. They all pursued the scorched earth 
policy12. The country descended into total anarchy, a human disaster was a fact and by 1992 
the famine peaked. The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention verified that 
mortality rates were “among the highest ever documented by a population survey among 
famine-affected civilians”13. Canadian photo journalist Philip Maher describes a fragment of 
the human tragedy: 
 
“But Somalia, I don't know if people really understand how bad Somalia was. I remember, there was a 
school bus, they took out all the seats, and each morning, the bus drove through the streets of Bidoa, picking 
up the dead bodies off the street. And then they'd go outside of town, and there were guys digging holes, and 
they would bury the bodies. Somalia was a horrible, horrible situation. You would leave the compound, and 
there would be dead people, ten feet from the compound. My first time into Somalia, I watched somebody die 
nearly every day.”14 
 
Humanitarian assistance was offered by numerous humanitarian organizations, but its 
delivery was hindered by the looting of humanitarian aid and even direct attacks on aid 
workers.  
                                                 
12 Russia offers the two classical examples of the successfulness of this strategy. The evicting of both Napoleon 
and Hitler from its territory (surely at the cost of great human suffering) owes a lot to this tactic. It must be 
noted, however, that neither one of the Russians’ adversaries had planned, nor were they equipped for a 
lengthy expedition and the temperature was to the advantage of the Russians. They were also both international 
armed conflicts. Without diminishing the human anguish that the scorched earth strategy resulted in, it might 
still be argued from a strictly legal viewpoint that starvation was not as expressly prohibited then as it is today, 
see Art 54(2) of API, see however the provision in Art 54(5) of that Protocol on imperative military necessity. 
It is noteworthy that the equivalent as concerns internal armed conflicts, Art 14 APII, does not offer any 
exemptions for military necessity. 
13 Walter Clarke, Learning From Somalia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p.47 
14 Quotation from interview with Philip Maher 5 February 2003 on World Vision’s homepage: 
http://www.worldvision.org.nz/news/archive2003/March2003/20030131_05.asp . Visited on 2 October 
2003. 
On the 3rd December 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) classified the 
tragedy, “further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance”, as a threat to international peace and security15. Determined, then, 
“to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance wherever needed in Somalia”16, the UNSC used the powers invested in it by 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize and call for “all necessary means to establish a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”17 The call was heeded by 
22 countries who all in all deployed about 31 500 troops and led by the United States which 
sent approximately 20 000 troops18, under the name ‘Operation Restore Hope’. Initially, the 
operation experienced some success in the delivery of relief aid. Soon, however, the UN 
mission degenerated into a battle with warlords of local clans. The confidence of the Somali 
population in general and the tribal belligerents in particular for the mission plunged19. There 
were allegations of soldiers under UN command committing numerous atrocities on the 
Somali population, which were amplified following the publication of several photographs 
showing Belgian paratroopers dangling a Somali boy over an open fire and urinating in the 
face of an injured or dead Somali20. There were direct attacks on UN personnel by SNA, and 
an actual bounty hunt for Aideed was commenced. The unsuccessful attempt to capture him 
took the lives of 300 Somalis and 40 UN troops. Naturally, this questioned the neutrality of 
the operation, since the UN effectively had taken sides in the internal conflict. The Somali 
malcontent was shown to the world by the pictures of the battered body of a dead American 
soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. On the 2nd of March 1995 the last 
UN forces left Somalia, following U.S. withdrawal a year earlier. The Somali conflict was, as 
pronounced by the then Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the first time the UNSC 
                                                 
15 S/RES/794 (1992), op.3 
16 Ibid. op.10 
17 Ibid, operative part para.10 and 11 
18 Daniel Williams, David Lancaster, ”Continuing Somali Violence May Delay U.S. Withdrawal”, in The 
Washington Post, February 26, 1993, (Vol. 113, No. 9), p.2 
19 It has been argued that some grave mistakes on behalf of the U.S and UN troops were made during their 
efforts to bridge the cultural gap that existed when they first intervened. For example, when U.S military forces 
distributed a leaflet as part of a psychological campaign to convince Somalis of the military's good intentions, 
there were a number of translation errors in the text. For example, the word “adoonka” in the text literally 
translates to mean, “slave.” It should have been translated to mean “United Nations.” So, instead of reading 
“United Nations,” the brochure read, “slave nations”. The Somalis interpreted this to mean the intervening 
nations thought of the Somalis as slaves. See Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and 
Morality, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 22. 
20 Het Laatste Nieuws, April 16, 1997. The pictures also circulate the net, e.g. at 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/17/belgium.somalia/ . Visited on 2 October 2003. 
had used force for “exclusively humanitarian internal reasons”21. In 2002, the non-
governmental organization (NGO) Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) estimated that 72% of 
the Somali population had no access to healthcare and 77% had no access to clean, potable 
water; that an estimated two million people had been displaced or killed since the civil war 
started in 1990; that infant and maternal mortality rates were the tenth and third highest in 
the world respectively; that around 500,000 people were currently threatened by severe food 
shortages; and that life expectancy was 44 years for men and 47 years for women22. 
 
‘Operation Restore Hope’ might have had some initial success, and it might well be argued 
that the humanitarian situation in Somalia was better after 1995 than it was in 199223. Others 
are of the opinion that delivering humanitarian assistance was harder after the troops had 
been in Somalia, because they had worsened the hostile environment24. It is noted in this 
context that there was a ratio of one to ten between humanitarian and military costs25. 
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Somali case is illustrative for the risks and issues 
inevitably connected with the enforcement of distribution of humanitarian assistance 
without the consent of the belligerent parties of a conflict. Firstly, impartiality might prove 
unsustainable when the enforcing mission finds itself forced to choose side when one 
belligerent party is obstructing the relief actions. This fosters local mistrust of the enforcing 
mission, which evidently will be catalyzed into malice in the eventuality of any atrocities 
committed by soldiers of that mission. Such misbehavior, as well as the lacunae of delicacy on 
behalf of the enforcing agents, will naturally also trigger the spite of an otherwise friendly 
population. These factors taken together might even worsen the war situation, the 
                                                 
21 Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing Importance of 
State Autonomy”, 336 Columbia. Journal of Transnational Law (1997), p.487. 
22 Médécins Sans Frontières, Bare Bone Facts About Somalia – an MSF briefing document, published December 9, 
2002. Available at: http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=EBA330D0-5A01-4054-
BF01154541756AD4 . Visited on 2 October 2003. 
23 Chester A. Crocker, ”The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong”, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 
1995 
24 Thomas Weiss ”Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome—’Operation Rekindle Hope’?” Global Governance: A 
Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations vol.1 no.2, 1995, p.13 
25 This was noted by former UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance Jan Eliasson in several public 
speeches in late 1993, referenced in Antonio Donini, ”Beyond Neutrality: On the Compatibility of Military 
Intervention and Humanitarian Assistance”, The Fletcher Forum, Summer/Fall 1995, p.34 
consequences of which the action was aimed to improve26. Secondly, other reasons for 
engaging in a relief action always lurk behind the curtain: strategic geographical positioning 
(in the case of Somalia, control of the southern entry to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal); the 
maintenance of a military budget (especially in the USA, a pressure factor for the 
government); and the control of natural resources have been seen to boost conflicts all over 
Africa, attracting foreign interests at the cost of civilian sufferance. The motives of misuse of 
the enforcement of humanitarian assistance as a veil for security policy, imperial ambitions 
or economic preying are numerous. Thus – whether the enforcing powers are drawn into it 
by necessity of circumstances, or for selfish reasons have envisaged a partial role from the 
beginning – distributing humanitarian assistance by force inexorably border political goals. 
                                                 
26 See to this, e.g. Weiss, op.cit., who on the Somali situation states: ”Two years and four billion dollars later, the 
warring parties are rested, better armed, and ready to resume civil war”. 
Part One – Humanitarian Assistance Law 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I – Fundamental issues 
 
This chapter will elaborate on the necessary initial definitions that need to be made within 
the limits of the essay, chiefly concerning the concept of humanitarian assistance as such. 
 
Primarily, in order to better comprehend the magnitude of the conflict of interests between 
State sovereignty and humanitarian assistance, it may prove utile to make a brief historical 
review on its origin. This outlook serves to highlight the profoundness of State sovereignty 
and the reluctance to yield it to whatever end, even humanitarian purposes. 
Historical perspective 
 
The notion of State sovereignty can be traced back to the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and 
the recognition of the princely State. The supremacy of the State within its sovereignty was 
implicit in the basis of the Peace of Augsburg – cuius region eius religio (“he who rules, his is the 
religion”). That constitutional principle, apart from ending Charles VIII ambitions for 
Respublica Christiana, entailed that the religion of a State was its internal affair. In its 
extension, it effectively had the consequence of excluding any outside interference in the 
relations with the prince and his subjects27. Albeit formally only applicable to the Holy 
Roman Empire, this practice spread to neighboring Christian European States, and it 
“carried as a corollary, another principle which rulers readily acknowledged and proclaimed 
though they did not always scrupulously observe it: non-interference by one State in the 
                                                 
27 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles – War, Peace and the Course of History, London, 2002, p.487 
affairs of another.”28 The cuius region eius religio principle was subsequently reaffirmed and 
ameliorated in the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to embrace not only religious 
but also political matters29, thus incorporating the State sovereignty of its internal affairs into 
the Grotian foundation of the system of international law, in principle existing to date. 
 
Attempts to convene consensus on issues susceptible to affect the principle of non-
interference – as it grew to be – in the internal affairs of a State were made after the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815. At the initiative of Tsar Alexander I, Russia, Austria and Prussia 
entered into the Treaty of the Holy Alliance which subsequently all European States except 
for the Ottoman Empire joined30. On a base of common Christian, conservative and 
autocratic values31, the State parties would intervene if a revolution occurred within the 
territory of anyone of them. Certainly, the authors of the Holy Alliance had the extroverted 
revolutionary enterprise of Napoleon fresh in mind. It cannot be ignored that the Holy 
Alliance indeed provided an international guarantee of the powers of the incumbent rulers; a 
façade for suppressing any internal resistance towards what might have been unjust regimes. 
In relation to this, it must be noted that inference in a State’s internal affairs according to the 
Holy Alliance was reserved for the enhancement of the strength of the challenged 
government, not – as was feared when provisions on delivery of humanitarian assistance 
surfaced in 1949 – interference to help whatever party to the internal conflict, including 
government adversaries. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Lieber Code of 
186332 was elaborated. It was subsequently used as the principal basis for the development of 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which in turn influenced later developments in 
IHL33. Although the Lieber Code contains some provisions that could be accorded in civil 
                                                 
28 Adam Watson, “European International Society and Its Expansion,” in The Expansion of International Society,  
H. Bull and A. Watson ed., Oxford, 1984, p.15 
29 Bobbitt, op.cit. p.506 
30 Treaty between Austria, Prussia and Russia, Paris 18-26 September 1815, re-printed in Michael Hurst, ed., Key 
Treaties for the Great Powers, 1815-1914, vol I, Newton Abbot, 1972, pp.96-97; Per Cramér, Neutralitet och 
Europeisk Integration, Stockholm, 1998, p.157 
31 Cramér, ibid. 
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wars, these instruments avoid any reference to the relations between a State and its own 
nationals and solely applies to international warfare34. 
 
During the first half of the 20th century, the principle of sovereignty was enshrined in Art 
2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations35 (the Charter) as the principle on which that 
organization is based as well as in Art 8 of the Convention of Rights and Duties of States 
(the Montevideo Convention)36. However, through Arts 2(7) and 25 together with Chapter 
VII of the Charter, the member States of the UN agreed to subject their sovereignty to the 
Security Council in matters that threats international peace and security. Thus were a basis, 
and a reason, for the international community to intervene in a State’s internal affairs 
constituted. Having experienced the terrifying events of another World War, the 
international community turned to natural law thoughts first initiated by, amongst others, 
John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Human rights thus made 
an entrance on the world scene, through the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
as well as the preamble of the UN Charter. In the sense of the proclaimed universality of 
human rights, the international community at least expressed an intention to be concerned 
about a State’s internal affairs with its nationals. During the 1968 Tehran International 
Conference on Human Rights, the United Nations considered for the first time the 
application of human rights in armed conflict37. 
 
During the negotiations leading up to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in spite of the horrific 
experiences of the non-international aspects of the world wars, as well as the Spanish Civil 
War38, the concern was still that extension of international law protections to armed 
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opponents of a government would enhance the status of those opponents39. Nevertheless, 
the conference succeeded in moving the a priori internal situation of a non-international 
armed conflict from the exclusive jurisdiction of the State concerned to a matter of 
international concern through treaty law, by the inclusion of Art 3, common to the four 
GC40. This established a keystone of humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts41. 
 
It can be argued that the diplomatic conference 1974-1977 leading up to the adoption of the 
two Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was, in a certain sense, influenced 
by the human rights law discussions in Tehran nine years earlier. What is certain, though, is 
that the dreadful events in Nigeria 1967-1970 (the ‘Biafra conflict’) did not leave the 
international community unaffected. Moreover, the conflict served as one of the first 
examples of the complexity and issues arising from the distribution of humanitarian aid in 
internal disputes, inter alia the question of access to the territory of the civilian victims42. The 
denial of access for humanitarian organizations to territories controlled by federal forces as 
well as those held by Biafran separatist rebels, contributed to the death of between two and 
three million persons, mostly from hunger and disease43. The Nigerian government had 
placed a total blockade on the region of eastern Nigeria (Biafra), inspecting all humanitarian 
aid and personnel, and the Biafran forces refused to accept humanitarian assistance that had 
been thus inspected as an interference with its independence44. 
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However, States took care to include in APII – which treats internal conflicts – a safeguard 
of their sovereignty in Art 3: 
 
1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or 
the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order 
in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State. 
 
2. Nothing is this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High 
Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs. 
 
Significantly, it was the Nigerian delegation that suggested Art 4(2) of the Draft Protocol II 
(Art 3(2) APII) on the prohibition of using the Protocol as a façade for intervention by other 
States be interpreted in a broad sense and that it be amended to include intervention by “all 
other organizations”45. That proposal naturally gave rise to criticism from other delegations, 
as it could comprise also the United Nations. Nigeria therefore proposed to efface the 
reference in the Draft Art 4 to intervention by “other States”, and leave it as it was adopted, 
“justification for intervening”46. 
 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding this safeguard, the fact remains that APII “develops and 
supplements”47 the Common Art 3 of the GC, and in doing so, it manifested the status of 
the principles founding the latter by confirming the (albeit limited) intrusion on State 
sovereignty stipulated in that Article. 
 
In more recent time, it would seem that States linger on the notion of sovereignty, although 
expressing their deepest concern for the sufferings of victims of conflicts and in some cases 
also a will to respond to such emergencies. Some say that such response has created a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, subjecting State sovereignty to human rights. Just as 
the Holy Alliance had a common base of values supporting intervention in its State parties’ 
internal affairs (Christianity, conservatism and autocracy), humanitarian intervention would 
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also take place on the grounds of common values, namely universal human rights. In its 
Guiding Principles on the strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency 
assistance of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly (UNGA), states that “the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”48, and it calls upon States to “facilitate 
the work”49 of humanitarian organizations.  
 
Without claiming to be exhaustive, it would seem that the situations where the conflict 
between State sovereignty and the access of humanitarian assistance would emerge, 
essentially could be narrowed down to the following: 1) the warring party possesses the 
essential provisions along with possibilities to distribute them, yet pursues a deliberate policy 
of denying these provisions to the civilian population; 2) the warring party has the essential 
provisions and is eager to distribute them, but that is hampered by its enemy50 and; 3) the 
warring party does not possess the essential provisions but still denies the distribution of the 
essential provisions to its civilian population, or hampers the passage of aid destined for its 
adversary’s territory. 
Criteria defining humanitarian assistance 
 
In order to be labeled ‘humanitarian’, the relief actions offered to a civilian population in 
distress by international organizations or State agencies must be “provided in accordance 
with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality”51. These principles are enshrined 
in the GCs Common Art 3, as well as in the Additional Protocols; concerning non-
international conflicts, Art 18 (2) of APII reads as follows: 
 
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its 
survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of 
an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse 
distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned. 
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 The principles are also found in the Statutes of many NGOs as well as in the Statues of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement52 and in the Guiding Principles on the 
Right to Humanitarian Assistance elaborated by the International Institute of Humanitarian 
Law in 199353. 
 
Materially, the relief actions comprise all supplies that are essential for the survival of the 
civilian population, such as foodstuffs and water, medical supplies, clothing, fuel, shelter, 
bedding, hospital equipment, etc. 
Humanity 
 
In a strictly legal context, the exigency that the aid be ‘humanitarian’ signifies that the only 
criterion for the distribution of relief is the need of the suffering. Consequently, the 
assistance will not contribute to either side of the conflict in which it operates, but its solemn 
goal is to, as expressed in the Fundamental Principles of the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may 
be found”. 
 
The principle of humanity has also been said to imply that humanitarian assistance can never 
be imposed “contre le gré des populations, des groupes, ou de la communauté qui souffrent”54. Given the 
evident anguish of the population in the situations at hand, such a conclusion appears 
superfluous. Surely, there will be situations where people seemingly refuse aid, but given the 
basic level of humanitarian need on which this issue would occur, it seems highly probable 
that the pure denial by a civilian population of aid essential to its existence would in fact be 
caused by elements suppressing or controlling that population, in one way or the other. 
Therefore, in cases where a denial on behalf of the civilian population is noticeable, inquiries 
ought to be made as to the real reason for the refusal and the actual living conditions of the 
population. 
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Impartiality 
 
Humanitarian assistance must be impartial meaning that the aid cannot be distributed on a 
discriminatory basis. Accordingly, no preference or disadvantage founded upon nationality, 
race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions must be given by the humanitarian 
organization.  
 
In its ruling in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua55, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that 
 
if the provision of ‘humanitarian assistance’ is to escape condemnation as an intervention in the 
internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of 
the Red Cross, namely to ‘prevent and alleviate human suffering’, and to ‘protect life and health and 
to ensure respect for the human being’; it must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to 
all in Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and its dependents.56 
 
This does not entail, however, that all must be treated equal or that age or even sex may not 
be decisive factors for who is granted relief since those two attributes might very well affect 
the need for help of a certain group of people or individuals. As mentioned above, the level 
of need is the sole criterion for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. In fact, the 
principle of impartiality does not necessarily prohibit even unilateral actions undertaken for 
the benefit of only one Party to the conflict if the circumstances prove to be such – e.g. the 
geographical situation – that this is the only feasible way in which a certain humanitarian 
actor could provide the assistance; otherwise “it would be stupid to wish to force [the actor] 
to abandon the action”57. 
 
It must be noted that, read e contrario, the judgment of the ICJ implies that had the provision 
of humanitarian assistance been given without discrimination, it would not have been 
condemned as an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. Earlier in its ruling, the 
Court had already stated that “provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons of forces in 
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another country […] cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention or as in any other way 
contrary to international law”58. 
 
It would seem logical to require that the delivery of humanitarian assistance be subject to 
reasonable conditions of proportionality. Without neglecting the suffering of all civilian 
populations experiencing the hardships of civil war, the limited resources allotted to 
humanitarian actors should be allocated so as to provide the basic needs for as many victims 
as possible. In this context, voices have been raised that the humanitarian aid is being 
distributed partly on grounds other than the sole criterion of need; especially the role of 
mass media (the ‘CNN Factor’) has been highlighted in this discussion59. This would entail 
what can be called ‘indirect impartiality’. In this sense, the impartiality principle does not 
only apply individually to each relief organization, but also to the ‘humanitarian community’ 
as a whole, and imposes a duty of co-operation between humanitarian actors. 
 
A factor which in a stealthier way is susceptible to menace the impartiality is the financing of 
a humanitarian venture. In reality, humanitarian organizations may see themselves forced to 
prioritize one disaster at the cost of another, since donors might have preferences as to the 
allocation of the aid. 
 
In some conflicts, e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina60 or Rwanda, a policy of so called ethnic cleansing 
was pursued, including inter alia massive forced deportation, detention and/or killing and 
raping of members of certain ethnic groups. The outrages on human dignity and freedom 
that the realization of ethnic cleansing entails may constitute genocide and crimes against 
humanity, as well as serious violations of the GCs and the laws or customs of war. It has 
been suggested that, for the instigators and planners of such a policy, the provision of 
humanitarian aid to the civilian population they seek to evict will, from their point of view, 
be discriminate per se because their policy of ethnic cleansing is61. However, as will be shown 
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further below, this is not so much a legal problem as it is a practical one since it will have 
serious implications on the possibilities to obtain the warring parties’ consent to receive 
humanitarian aid. It would however be absurd if the illegal nature of the conduct of 
hostilities could also imbrue the intent and actions of the humanitarian organizations. 
Neutrality 
 
The third pillar of humanitarian assistance is closely associated with the foregoing principle 
of impartiality and stipulates that the relief action must be neutral in that it may never be 
integrated into a political process or linked to the use of military means. It has been 
categorically said that assistance imposed by armed force as a part of a unilateral action is 
interference in the conflict and therefore does not meet the criterion of neutrality62. 
Conversely, it has been argued that the armed protection of the assistance would not divest 
it of its neutral character, provided that the affected States have fully approved the principles 
and procedures of the armed escort and that the protection is solely aimed at bandits and 
common criminals63. It would seem clear that the fact that an affected State has arbitrarily 
refused the humanitarian assistance would not menace the neutrality of the aid, as long as it 
is not accompanied by the use of armed force (cf. above on ethnic cleansing). When the relief 
action is undertaken by a third-party State after persistent arbitrary refusal and fruitless 
negotiations, some are of the opinion that it would constitute a legitimate countermeasure, 
and thus not amount to interference64, (see however below on reciprocity under non-
international armed conflicts and also on enforcement). 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) along with many authors is of the 
opinion that Art 18 APII confers a right on organizations fulfilling the above mentioned 
principles to provide humanitarian assistance; the affected State is not entitled to give its 
arbitrary refusal to such assistance65. Supporting that view, the question of enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance becomes perhaps less controversial than if advocating a strict 
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exigency of State consent, since the enforcement in the former case would met en œuvre an 
action which is in accordance with international humanitarian law. According to a more 
pragmatic view, however, and notwithstanding opinions taken on the consent issue, it is not 
unlikely – lacking the affected State’s approval and having exhausted other remedies – that 
the required aid can only be delivered by way of force. In such cases, it is important that also 
the actor enforcing humanitarian aid be neutral. The United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows how this was at least formally achieved 
whereas the NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrates an example to the contrary. 
 
The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), was initially established as a peace-
keeping force with the consent of the warring parties Croatia and Yugoslavia66. Albeit thus 
deployed in Croatia it was envisaged that UNPROFOR continue its peacekeeping activities 
also in Bosnia-Herzegovina67, where it was mandated to ensure the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, especially to the besieged city of Sarajevo68. In its resolution 770, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC called on States to take “all measures necessary” to 
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina69. In further discussions, it was however decided that this task should be 
entrusted to UNPROFOR70. UNPROFOR was to also support the United Nation High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its delivery of humanitarian aid, especially through 
protection of convoys71. UNPROFOR was thus a peacekeeper, and as such it had no 
Chapter VII mandate, but it was at the same time an enforcer of humanitarian assistance in 
which capacity it did have such mandate. Any confusion as to the role of UNPROFOR 
would thus have concerned when it was acting as an enforcing agent of humanitarian aid and 
when it was not. But seeing that in the latter cases it would still have been under an 
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obligation to stay neutral, UNPROFOR would seem susceptible to remain so also in its 
capacity of enforcer of humanitarian aid. 
 
The Kosovo crisis on the other hand offers an example of neutrality put in question. On the 
24th of March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began its air strikes 
against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), without any authorization from 
the UNSC to do so. Subsequently, the UNHCR itself made a public request to NATO for 
assistance with the humanitarian aid operation72. From a neutrality point of view, this created 
the awkward situation that “the dominant humanitarian player was a party to the conflict, the 
very antithesis of an impartial actor”73, and the request certainly put the neutrality (and 
perhaps confidence) of UNHCR into question. Allegedly, the consequences were inter alia 
that refugees in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM) were 
benefiting from aid at the expense of refugees in the FRY74. 
 
There is, however, a common problem for both UNPROFOR and NATO pertaining to 
their roles as enforcers of humanitarian assistance, which is equally relevant to any actor in 
that position. That problem is that these agents may very likely find themselves in a situation 
were they cannot stay neutral to the relevant armed conflict as they would have to take 
action (militarily or economically) against the subject(s) hindering the aid. When these 
subjects are not just common criminals, but have a self-perception of being parties to the 
armed internal conflict, how could enforcing agents solve their task of ensuring the delivery 
of humanitarian aid by force, when it becomes critical, without engaging these parties? In 
these cases, the mission of the enforcers is flawed with an inherent lack of neutrality. The 
risks of this non-neutrality to spill over75 to the humanitarian agents must be minimized 
because lack of neutrality divests a relief organization of its humanitarian character for a 
good reason, namely in order to close the gates to exploitation of relief actions for other 
than purely humanitarian ends76. If it is accepted that humanitarian assistance in certain cases 
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must be forcibly delivered, it is thus imperative to sustain a clear-cut distinction between the 
agents providing the humanitarian assistance and the agents enforcing it. It is equally 
important to prudently elaborate a set of clear rules regulating when, how and by who 
humanitarian aid could be enforced. 
 
Perhaps neutrality lies in the eyes of the beholder. A humanitarian enterprise may be 
perceived as neutral by some whilst it is rejected by others as taking sides in the armed 
conflict. Arguably, the opinion of an outside, disinterested person concerning the neutrality 
might be of particular relevance for the legality of a decision to enforce humanitarian relief 
(c.f. below on an Alternative procedure for enforcement decision-making) whereas the 
attitudes of the victims and warring parties on the ground will affect the efficiency of such 
an action. 
 
Right of initiative 
 
An organization or relief action that fulfills the criteria of humanity, impartiality and 
neutrality is defined as humanitarian. Conversely, should it subsequently prove to be lacking 
any of these three conditions, it will seize to be humanitarian. The offer of services by a 
humanitarian organization, as defined above, benefits from the presumption that it “shall not 
be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts”77. Common Art 3 and 
Art 18 APII give to such organizations what usually is referred to as a ‘right of initiative’, in 
the sense that the belligerents retain complete freedom to refuse or accept an offer of 
humanitarian assistance, but the aid may not in itself be considered as a hostile act or as 
intervention78. The extent of the right of initiative as well as the bordering of the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance to humanitarian intervention has been hinted above 
and will be discussed in detail further below. 
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The contents of denial of humanitarian assistance 
 
For the purposes of this essay, it is understood that a decision by a responsible authority to 
deny humanitarian assistance will be backed up by actions on its part to realize the denial. 
Naturally, the manners in which humanitarian assistance can be impeded are numerous and 
diverse. The obstruction can be carried out by numerous different actors, such as 
government agents, paramilitary groups, bandits or even members of the civilian population 
who are not the intended beneficiaries of the aid. In addition, especially in the case of civil 
wars between different paramilitary factions and militias, it may from time to time be 
difficult to distinguish people in their capacity of civilians and combatants. There are also 
various means of hindering aid from reaching its beneficiaries, for example by excessive 
supervision, blockades, taxes or intimidation of aid workers. A statement from the 
responsible authority that the security of humanitarian organizations cannot be guaranteed is 
often a very effective method of hampering the humanitarian work79. The purposes behind a 
denial of humanitarian assistance can also be multiple. In cases when a policy of ethnic 
cleansing is pursued, the starvation of a civilian population may further that policy. 
Furthermore, belligerents may confiscate supplies in order to nourish their troops, instead of 
feeding ‘useless mouths’80. However, one cannot accept the simplistic view that all 
obstruction is done with a purely cruel intent; often the reason for not accepting the relief 
action is that the latter is not deemed impartial or neutral to the conflict. Reasons are often 
multifaceted and may include legitimate military considerations twinned with clandestine 
ones. 
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Chapter II – Provisions of international law 
 
The present chapter will first seek the existence of an obligation to receive humanitarian 
assistance within the main legal instrument on the area, namely the Geneva Conventions 
with Additional Protocols. Then, the denial of humanitarian aid as an international crime 
under other provisions of international law will be discussed. 
Non-international armed conflicts 
 
If an elucidation to the conflict of interests between relief actions and State sovereignty is to 
be pursued within the conventional sources of IHL, it will first be necessary to verify the 
existence of an armed conflict. For the purposes of this essay, that conflict would be of a 
non-international character. These two characteristics are rudimentary conditions of 
Common Art 3 and Art 1 APII. 
 
A general particularity of the GCs and APs is that once ascertained applicable, they impose 
obligations upon the High Contracting Parties regardless of the ‘justness’ of the war or 
reciprocity, see Art 1 common to the four GCs, which reads: 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention 
in all circumstances. (Emphasis added) 
 
This means that one warring State cannot avoid the application of the GCs on the basis that 
its adversary State does not respect them. The ordinary practice of reciprocal obligations, as 
stipulated in Art 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties81, is not suited for this 
field of international law, seeing that the original beneficiaries (i.e. the civilian populations) 
are not legal parties to the conventions. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has ascertained that the bulk of humanitarian law lays down obligations 
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which are not based on reciprocity82, but that these rules are of an erga omnes nature. 
However, some immediate reciprocity is advocated by certain authors83. 
 
This ‘universality’ of the GCs and subsequently the Common Art 384, also applies to the 
insurgent party of a non-international armed conflict: “the dissident armed group may 
reasonably be expected to apply the rules” of the APII85. To this see, also further below on 
the different parties to an international armed conflict. 
 
Armed conflict 
 
Common Art 3 does not contain a definition of what is an armed conflict and in the absence 
of clarity, it gave rise to a variety of interpretations and in practice its applicability was often 
denied86. Seeking to overcome these issues, Art 1 APII stipulates the following conditions in 
order to determine whether an armed conflict is present thus leading to the application of 
the Protocol: 
 
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to [the GCs] without modifying 
its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by 
Article 1 of [API] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
 
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. 
 
The threshold where APII becomes applicable is thus intended to be at a certain degree of 
intensity of the material conflict87. Moreover, one of the belligerents must be the armed 
                                                 
82 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kupreskić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement 14 January 2000, para. 517. 
83 René Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Cambrigde Studies in International and 
Comparative Law, 2002, p.139-140. 
84 Jean Pictet et al. Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, p.36-37 
85 Provost, op.cit., p.157 
86 Jean Pictet et al., ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p.1348, para.4448 
87 Ibid., p.1343, para.4438 
forces of the State Party, which entails that the Protocol will not apply to conflicts between 
two warring dissident groups. Thus, not all cases of non-international armed conflict are 
covered by APII, as is the case in Common Art 3; the scope of the former is narrower. 
 
As envisaged by the second paragraph of Art 1 APII, internal sporadic acts of violence do 
not constitute armed conflict in a legal sense, even if the government should find itself 
forced to resort to police or military action in order to restore law and order88. 
 
An interesting point worth mentioning in this context and linked to the principles of 
humanitarian assistance is the recognition by third-party States (or other international actors, 
for that matter) of a situation of belligerency under APII. It may be argued that, in situations 
were the de facto circumstances are not such as to fulfill the pre-requisites of Art 1 APII, such 
a recognition could constitute an act interfering with the internal affairs of the affected State. 
The last paragraph of Common Art 3 offers partly a solution to this by stating that the 
application of that Article does not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict. Since 
all references to ‘Parties to the conflict’ had been removed from the original Draft of APII, 
the proposal of a similar provision was dropped from the Draft89. 
 
Non-international character 
 
I will be useful for the purposes of the present study to dwell awhile on the boundaries 
between international and non-international armed conflicts, because their distinction is not 
always clear, nor is it exempt of dispute. The delimitation is, nevertheless, an important one, 
since it may be critical to the application of the vastly elaborate body of rules applicable in 
international conflicts, or leave the civilian population with recourse only to Common Art 3 
and APII. 
 
As a mutual starting point, both Common Art 3 and Art 1(1) APII (see quotation above), 
define the non-international character of an armed conflict – as its appellation suggests – 
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negatively: an armed conflict that is not of an international character. However, as 
mentioned above, Art 1(2) APII leaves the application of APII more restrained. 
 
Noteworthy is Art 1(4) API which places peoples fight against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in their exercise of self-determination, as enshrined in 
the UN Charter in the realm of international conflicts. Thus, the concept of international 
conflict far from always equals inter-State warfare and does not presuppose that the 
belligerents must be States. The right of self-determination falls however outside the 
framework of this paper. 
 
There might be cases when an insurgent has such control over a territory and the people 
living there, that it amounts to Statehood according to Art 1 of the Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States90. In these cases, the body of rules applicable to international 
armed conflicts should apply. But there are less clear-cut situations when the boundaries of 
an internal conflict are obscured by the ‘internationalization’ of the conflict. As is well 
known, many hot clashes during the Cold War were in fact ‘proxy wars’, sustained to a 
greater or lesser extent by the superpowers and/or their allies, (Korea, Vietnam and Angola 
to name only a few). Thus, a prima facie internal conflict may, at least in a legal context, be 
considered international. 
 
In the aforementioned Nicaragua Case, the ICJ stipulated what has come to be known as an 
‘effective control’ test in order to determine whether the involvement of another State 
amounts to a degree that will render the armed conflict ‘internationalized’ or not. If there 
was “dependence on the one side and control on the other” it would be right to equate, for 
legal purposes, the contras with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on 
behalf of that government91. The ICJ did not consider the contras a State agent of the United 
States, since the violations of humanitarian law perpetrated by the contras “could be 
committed by members of the contras without the control of the United States”92. When 
                                                 
90 This was perhaps the case of the Serbian province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, during the 
Bosnian war 1992-1995. It is important to keep in mind in this context that the acquiring of Statehood is 
independent of recognition from other States, Art 3 of the Montevideo Convention. 
91 Nicaragua v. The United States of America, ICJ 27 June 1986, para.109 
92 Ibid. para.115 
pronouncing itself on this issue in the Tadić Appeal Judgment93, the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY disagreed on the level of State control required and found the ‘effective control’ test 
unpersuasive94. Firstly, because a condition of strict control in all situations would not be 
consonant with the rules governing State responsibility95, especially Art 8 of the Draft on 
State Responsibility and the same rules as provisionally adopted in 1998 by the ILC Drafting 
Committee96. The very purpose of this rule is to see to it that the States cannot avoid 
responsibility simply by ordering the acts entailing liability to a non-State individual or party. 
Secondly, the ICTY Appeals Chamber argued that the ‘effective control’ test was at variance 
with judicial and State practice97. The Appeals Chamber endorsed a less strict view in favor 
of flexibility seeing that situations of this kind will not be static. 
 
Adding to the complexity, armed conflicts may also be ‘mixed’ in composition, that is, partly 
showing characteristics of internal armed conflicts, but at the same time presenting features 
of international armed conflicts. As confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, this was the 
case in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina98. However, this ‘mixed’ approach embraced by the 
Appeals Chamber is not without issues, and it did not follow the tendencies in the doctrine 
to treat an armed conflict as one entity and let it be either international or non-international 
in its entirety99. 
 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber based its reasoning for supporting this ‘mixed’ view in the 
Tadić Case on the following reductio ad absurdum argument100. If the conflict between the 
Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb forces (including the Yugoslav National Army, JNA, 
and Bosnian Serb action on behalf of the JNA) was regarded as international in its entirety, 
atrocities committed by the Bosnian Government towards the Bosnian Serb civilians would 
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100 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, the Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence motion for interlocutory appeal on 
jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.76 
be of an internal character, seeing the Bosnian nationality of the latter who would thus not 
benefit from the wide protection of GC IV, whereas atrocities committed by the JNA (or, 
when applicable, the Bosnian Serbs acting as an agent of that army) towards Bosnian 
civilians would be an international conflict, affording the Bosnian civilians the protection of 
that convention. This would place the Bosnian Serb civilians at a legal disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the Bosnian central authorities.  
 
The one reasonable way to legally dissect this conflict would seem to be to consider the 
conflict between the JNA (including the Bosnian Serbs when applicable) and the Bosnian 
Government as international and the one between the Bosnian Serbs (not on behalf of the 
JNA) and the Bosnian Government as internal in character. Then, the fact still remains that 
atrocities committed against the Bosnian Serb civilians by the Bosnian Government would 
not afford the former the comprehensive protection of GC IV, but merely the much 
narrower protection of APII. Those attacks would namely be a part of the internal conflict 
between Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Government. If the attacks were upon Bosnian 
Serbs forming part of the JNA, they would be upon the other warring party (and not a 
civilian population) of the international conflict101. In neither case could the Bosnian Serbs 
be afforded the protection of GC IV as the civilian population of the adversary of the 
Bosnian Government. Thus, the difference in protection remains even after the proposed 
legal dissection of the conflict102.  
 
The unfortunate circumstance that a substantial population of enemy ethnicity (for the lack 
of a better expression) happens to find itself being of the nationality and within the territory 
of a State that is at war with another State that represents that ethnicity, can hardly be 
remedied merely through the concept of ‘mixed’ internal-international armed conflicts. A 
theoretical solution, it seems to me, would have been to keep the distinction of the parties as 
suggested above, but to recognize both the conflict between the JNA and the Bosnian 
Government as well as the one between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Government as 
international103. 
                                                 
101 And as such, perhaps fall under the protection of GC I or GC III. 
102 As argued by Greenwood, op.cit. 
103 However, recognizing statehood for the Republika Srpska was admittedly a rather sensitive issue. 
 The discussion above serves to illustrate that there may be complex armed conflicts where 
the GC set of rules will afford different protection to different civilian victims of such a 
conflict. This reveals a certain lack of neutrality inherent in the GC body. 
 
Refusal of State consent 
 
At the outset, it must be emphasized that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the 
responsibility to ensure the proper nourishment and other essentials of the population of a 
country first and foremost rests upon the State. Relief societies are only called upon to play 
an auxiliary role by assisting the authorities in this task104. 
Limitations on the right of denial 
 
As mentioned above under the description of the principle of neutrality, humanitarian 
organizations have a ‘right of initiative’ in offering relief actions. Concerning non-
international armed conflicts, this is pronounced in Art 18 (1) APII: 
 
Relief societies located in the territory of the High contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red 
Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services (…) 
 
Art 18(2) AP II in fine stipulates that if the civilian population is suffering undue hardship 
owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, relief actions “shall be undertaken 
subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”. 
 
A strict reading of these provisions clearly necessitates the agreement of the affected State to 
receive the humanitarian assistance, in order for the humanitarian actors to be able to 
perform their functions.  
 
                                                 
104 Jean Pictet et al., ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p.1477, para.4871. This principle is equally 
enshrined e.g. in Art 55 GC IV. 
Concerning international conflicts, Art 59 GC IV states that when the whole or part of the 
population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied the Occupying Power “shall 
agree to relief schemes” on behalf of that population. This would seem to be the most 
imperative stipulation of the GC complex with respect to affected States’ lack of possibility 
to arbitrarily refuse humanitarian aid. Art 70 API asserts that relief actions “shall be 
undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such actions”. The consent 
clause in Art 70 API was included during the diplomatic conference 1974-1977 essentially 
out of a concern to protect the national sovereignty of the State receiving the relief.105 
However, it was clearly stated that this reservation did not imply that the Contracting Parties 
could refuse to give their agreement for arbitrary reasons.106 Thus, the denial of access of 
humanitarian assistance in international armed conflicts must be founded on valid grounds. 
 
Returning to internal armed conflicts, the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol II 
states that the fact Art 18 APII requires consent “does not mean that the decision is left to 
the discretion of the parties”107. The Commentary then goes on to exemplify this by putting 
forward that denial of access to relief societies would amount to a violation of Art 14 APII 
prohibiting starvation as a method of warfare108. It also points to the authoritative in the 
expression “shall be undertaken”, appearing also in other versions of the text, e.g. “seront 
enterprises”. 
 
When the living conditions for the civilian population are such as those described in Art 
18(2) APII (“undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival”) 
humanitarian aid will indeed make the difference between whether civilians starve or not.  
However, even accepting the Commentary’s assumption that starvation in all circumstances 
would be used as a method of warfare109 (but emphasizing that it indeed could be), its 
argumentation deserves a few comments. Firstly, it is contradictory to a clear and express 
provision of the Article that does not appear to be open to interpretation, at least not to the 
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”Method of combat” is a vague term and could certainly be interpreted as including many measures, perhaps 
even defensive ones, but it would have to be directly connected to the conduct of hostilities and not merely to 
the general fact that a war is raging. 
extent suggested. As indicated by the Commentary, this leads to a contradiction within the 
APII: a State could be in breach of Art 14 but in compliance with Art 18(2) if it refused to 
give its consent to the delivery of humanitarian aid essential to the survival of the civilian 
population on the insurgent’s territory with the purpose of weakening the rebellion. That 
State would starve civilians as a method of warfare in violation of Art 14, but have the right 
to refuse the aid under Art 18(2). Secondly, the analysis of Art 18(2) in fine which this 
contradiction entails evidently would have to be carried out in the light of the humanitarian 
concerns underlying the whole GC complex, but in order to be fair and truly bona fide an 
interpretation must also beware of the fact that the Contracting States did envisage a 
difference between the rules applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts 
(see the historical perspective above). Moreover, States still appear to sustain this distinction: 
drawing on the same subject as the commentary’s example, it is not accidental that the Rome 
Statute does not treat the willful impeding of relief supplies as the war crime of starvation 
concerning non-international conflicts110 (see further below under starvation as an 
international crime). 
 
There are some indications with differing merits pointing towards the ICRC interpretation 
of Art 18 APII that States are not free to deny humanitarian assistance. Firstly, being one of 
the most important actors on the humanitarian scene and one of the initiators of the APs, 
the ICRC could hardly endorse any other standpoint, which they moreover share with many 
other actors on the international scene111. In this capacity, the opinion of the ICRC is 
naturally also of value for the legal status quo of the APs. Secondly, in its ruling in the 
aforementioned Nicaragua case, the ICJ stated that the “provision of strictly humanitarian aid 
to persons of forces in another country […] cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention or 
as in any other way contrary to international law”112, which is in line with the presumption 
according to Common Art 3 and Art 18 APII (see above under ‘Right of initiative’) that the 
aid as such is not to be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. 
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The finding that the provision of ‘pure’ relief would not be “contrary to international law” 
hints to that anyone delivering humanitarian aid in the absence of State consent does not 
engage in an illegal act. However, it cannot equally be deducted from the ruling that the State 
refusing its consent to the aid thus legally delivered engages in an illegal act on its part. 
Moreover, it would seem very bold to conclude that the ICJ referred to more than the 
delivery of relief as such, i.e. not including all the measures to be undertaken to implement it, 
which might very well entail the use of force. The authors of the GCs certainly did not 
envisage an enforcement action. Nevertheless – and thirdly – the UNSC has taken such 
enforcement action on several occasions (see below under ‘Enforcement’) in cases where the 
responsible authority has refused the aid to be delivered. However, such action was not 
necessarily altogether in accordance with the rules governing the UNSC. Furthermore, even 
if the Council should be considered a reliable interpreter of international law despite its 
highly political nature, its basis for interference was that a threat to international peace and 
security was at hand. Nevertheless, this does not extinguish the fact that there have been 
cases where sovereign rights have been subjected to humanitarian assistance. This is further 
supported by the cases where States a have acted unilaterally in response to the obstruction 
of humanitarian aid, or at least under that pretext, albeit very doubtfully adhering to 
international law in doing so. The question may be asked, however, if the UNSC or 
individual States would be prepared to take such action in all potential cases, 
notwithstanding the country in which they were to intervene, e.g. a permanent Member of 
the Council. 
 
Another important aspect of the consent issue in a non-international context is who shall 
give the consent to humanitarian assistance being delivered. The diction of Art 18(2) in fine 
APII requires the consent only of the “High Contracting Party concerned” (i.e. the legal 
government responsible for foreign affairs) and not that of its internal adversary. It would 
thus seem that a certain inequality between the belligerent parties is inherent in the text of 
Art 18 APII (and consequently in Common Art 3), potentially threatening the principle of 
neutrality. In the light of the historical preservation of State sovereignty, this provision is 
nevertheless not surprising since a requirement to obtain approval also from a rebellious 
political or military entity exercising the effective control over a territory within the (former) 
boundaries of the affected State Party, would be to a priori recognize the opponents of that 
government. However, as noted above, an insurgent party falling under the application of 
APII according to its Art 1 is determined on the basis of whether that belligerent has, to a 
certain extent, the de facto control over a territory. It would then be rational to consider such 
an insurgent also a party “concerned” in the sense of Art 18 (2) in fine. Consequently, a High 
Contracting State would only be “concerned” and its consent thus required if the aid would 
have to pass over the territory that it itself controlled113 and not when taking the tour over 
land controlled exclusively by an insurgent. For example, the consent of the Sri Lankan 
government was thus in theory not needed for the Indian operation in 1987 to provide aid to 
the Tamils under attack in the Jaffna region by Sri Lankan government forces. Seeing that 
the food and medical supplies had to be accompanied by Indian military jets into Sri Lankan 
airspace in order to reach the Tamil population114, this example shows the implications of the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance in reality. Therefore, approval of all parties to an 
internal armed conflict may indeed prove essential to deliver the aid in real life (which is 
illustrated also e.g. by the Biafran conflict) because both governments and insurgents will 
consider themselves “concerned”, and they both will possess means to physically impede any 
unwanted assistance. 
 
An issue in relation to the question treated in the preceding paragraph, is the one of burden 
of argumentation. Following documents from the UNGA and UNSC, the burden of 
argumentation rests upon the party refusing humanitarian aid115. 
 
In cases where a civil war has raged for a long time, it might prove difficult to categorize any 
of the warring factions under Art 1 APII. In such events, the ICRC Commentary suggests 
that consent could be presumed, because the salvage of the civilian population from any 
further anguish is then of “paramount importance and should not suffer any delay”116. 
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Notwithstanding any affirmations that Art 18 TPII has achieved status as customary 
international law117, it would appear dubious to equally assert that the substance of such a 
rule is in accordance with the ICRC interpretation, especially in the light of Art 2(4) and 2(7) 
of the United Nations Charter and lacking any explicit decisions on the issue118. Even though 
States rapidly condemn other States for not granting access to humanitarian aid119 and even 
though State have taken actions to enforce humanitarian aid when impeded, it deserves to be 
reiterated that it remains uncertain if they would not uphold their own sovereignty when 
faced with a similar situation themselves. The usus and opinio juris elements of an international 
customary rule are after all the State’s own acts and legal convictions, not what they believe 
should be applicable to all other States but themselves. 
 
It would certainly be desirable that States be encouraged to give interpretative declarations to 
the APs and/or enter into treaties with the UN to the effect that they clearly give up their 
(potential) sovereign rights to deny humanitarian assistance other than for clearly specified 
reasons. The mentioned Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance, 
elaborated by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law could in relevant parts stand 
model for such declarations or treaties, at least insofar as they deal with a right to provide 
humanitarian aid. Principle 10 states that “all authorities will grant the facilities necessary for 
humanitarian assistance to be provided” and Principle 6 gives the States and organizations 
concerned a right to undertake “all necessary means” to ensure access to the aid in situations 
where that is being refused (see further below on the issue of enforcement). This would 
naturally require that States have confidence in the neutrality of the humanitarian operation, 
which is also a prerequisite stated in the preamble of the mentioned Guiding Principles. 
 
                                                 
117 The ICTY Appeals Chamber found in Tadić, (Decision 2 October 1995) that "the Additional Protocol II 
[…] can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary 
law", para.117. 
118 The ICTY Trial Chamber I concluded in Prosecutor v. Pale Strugar et.al., Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Decision on 
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119 To mention only one example, condemnation of the refusal of both sides in the Biafra conflict for not 
agreeing on the delivery of relief was universal, George A. Mudge, “Starvation as a Means of Warfare”, 
International Law, vol.4 1970, p.255-264 
In conclusion, APII does not give any clear guidance on whether there exists a right to 
provide humanitarian assistance according to international humanitarian law. Surely, the 
notion of such a right is pleasant and profitable for mankind. In its attempt to approach the 
problem pragmatically, the present paper will save any conclusions on a right to deliver 
humanitarian aid until several other aspects of the issue have been discussed, especially the 
enforcement of such a potential right. 
Illegality of a State’s refusal to give consent 
 
Even if we accept the notion that Art 18 APII does contain a right to provide humanitarian 
assistance, the potentially vast and blurry scope of what are ‘valid reasons’ for the denial will 
still provide a loophole for States to deny the access of humanitarian assistance in reality. It 
is clear that refusals that would entail violations of the Common Art 3 and APII (e.g. the 
prohibition of starvation in Art 14 APII) would not be valid. The principle of 
proportionality might also be of some assistance as to determine the validity of the denial. 
 
There may also be cases when the subjective element on the part of the individuals in the 
refusing authority amounts to the mens rea of certain international crimes. Below, an 
examination will be conducted of some breaches of international law applicable in internal 
armed conflicts that may be constituted by a denial to accept humanitarian aid. It must be 
noted that in the jurisprudence of the international tribunals, international crimes have been 
perpetrated by individuals, not by States120. These individuals might have used their States as 
tools for committing the crimes, but the States as such have not been on trial121. The Rome 
Statute explicitly states that official capacity of an alleged criminal is without any relevance 
for the jurisdiction of the Court (Art 27). Thus, Heads of State and government or 
parliament and other State officials are not exempt from criminal responsibility under the 
Rome Statute. 
 
                                                 
120 See e.g. articles 1-5 of the ICTY Statute (S/RES/827 of 25 May 1993 as amended) and articles 1-4 of the 
ICTR Statute (S/RES/955 of 8 November 1994 as amended) which all mention ”persons”. In Art 6 of the 
ICTY Statute and Art 5 of the ICTR Statute it then clarified that the Tribunals “shall have jurisdiction over 
natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute.” 
121 See however below on Serbia and Montenegro pursuing several of the NATO countries before the ICJ for 
alleged crimes committed through NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
With this individual perspective in mind, the war crimes122 of starvation, torture, cruel 
treatment and collective punishments will be treated, followed by a dealing with crimes 
against humanity and genocide. Nota bene that the impeding of the relief, depending on the 
circumstances in each case, may form several crimes at the same time. It must also be noted 
that crimes against humanity123 and genocide124 can be committed irrespectively of the 
international character of the conflict. Furthermore, the commission of these crimes does 
not even require an armed conflict to be established, but they may equally be perpetrated in 
times of peace.125 
Starvation 
Art 14 APII prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of combat. This article specifies 
the Common Art 3(1)(a) in fine126 as well as the general principle laid down in Art 13 APII 
protecting civilians against the dangers arising from military operations. It is noteworthy that 
Art 14 APII does not make any exception in case of imperative military necessity, as 
opposed to its equivalent concerning international armed conflicts, Art 54 API. Art 14 APII 
is intertwined with Art 18127, and when the intent128 of the individuals in the refusing 
authority covers a proven fact that the impeding of the aid in fact was used as a method of 
combat, the denial of humanitarian assistance would constitute the war crime of starvation.  
 
The Rome Statute clearly differs between international and non-international conflicts with 
respect to the hindrance of humanitarian assistance. As concerns international armed 
conflicts, Art 8(b)(xxv) prohibits the intentional use of starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare, “including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
Conventions”. The wording of the equivalent concerning non-international armed conflicts, 
Art 8(e)(iii), is more confined as it prohibits “attacks against […] humanitarian assistance”. 
                                                 
122 The fact that war crimes can be committed also in the context of internal conflicts is confirmed, inter alia, by 
the ICTR Statute Art 4 and by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Tadić, (Decision 2 October 1995). 
123 See the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić, (Decision 2 October 1995), para.141 
124 Art 1 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UNTS 1951, 
p.278 
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126 Jean Pictet et al., ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p.1456, para.4794 
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128 Not being a set of criminal rules in the strict sense and being aimed more at States than individuals (as 
opposed to the Rome Statute) APII does not specifically mention intent to breach its provisions. As 
mentioned, this has been solved by the Statutes of the international tribunals by them referring to violations of 
the GCs, APs and other crimes as being committed by persons. See supra note 107. 
Furthermore, that provision does not express such attacks as a means of starvation. Thus, 
the mere denial of humanitarian aid, implemented via other means than direct attacks, in a 
non-international armed conflict would not be a violation of the Rome Statute. However, 
once asserted that such an attack is at hand, Art 8(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute will apply to a 
broader range of situations than Art 14 APII, since internal disturbances has not been 
excluded from the former provision129.  
Torture and cruel treatment 
Art 4(2)(a) APII and Common Art 3(1)(a) prohibit cruel treatment and torture. Torture is 
defined in the Torture Convention of 1984130. That definition has been considered by the 
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as representing customary 
international law131 and the ICTY has also confirmed that both torture and cruel treatment 
carry the same meaning regardless of the international or non-international character of the 
conflict in which these crimes are committed132. Without quoting the definition of the 
Torture Convention, it suffices to note that severe pain or suffering must be intentionally 
inflicted upon the victim for certain purposes, e.g. obtaining information from him or 
punishing him. However, such purposes need only be part of the motivation behind the 
conduct; it is not necessary that the acts are solely perpetrated for a prohibited purpose133. If 
the pre-requisites of the Torture Convention are satisfied, nothing in that text or subsequent 
jurisprudence hampers the denial of humanitarian assistance as being a possible form of 
torture. However, it would probably meet with less practical obstacles to establish torture 
thus committed on a small scale, for example within a detention camp, rather than in the 
context of a State’s actions within the whole of its territory. 
 
Concerning cruel treatment, the purpose of the act is not an element of the offence. That 
entails that the threshold for this crime is lower than is the case with torture. This leads to 
                                                 
129 Whereas Art 8(c) of the Rome Statute, which refers to Common Art 3, is expressly limited in the same way 
as the portal of APII, i.e. its Art 1(2) in that it excludes  riots and other similar conflicts. 
130 Art 1(1), UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, A/RES/39/46 entered into force 26 June 1987 
131 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., Judgement 16 November 1998, Case No. IT-96-21, para.459; ICTR: 
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Judgement 2 September 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para.593 
132 Delalić et al. op.cit., para.443 
133 Ibid., para.470 
that all acts or omissions constituting torture would also qualify as cruel treatment134. The 
deprivation of adequate water, sleeping and toilet facilities and medical care are examples of 
things that have been found to be especially contributive in amounting acts to cruel 
treatment135. A crime of cruel treatment could thus be perpetrated by the means of denying 
humanitarian assistance. 
Collective punishments 
Art 4(2)(b) APII bans collective punishments, and its status as a war crime is confirmed inter 
alia by the ICTR Statute136. This prohibition was included in Art 4 APII by consensus and 
the provision should, according to the ICRC commentary, be understood in its widest sense 
as including any kind of sanction137. It was inspired by Art 33 GC IV138, in relation to which 
the ICRC commentary defines collective punishment as “penalties of any kind inflicted on 
persons or entire groups of persons in defiance of the most elementary principles of 
humanity, for acts that these persons have not committed”139 This crime seems well fitted 
for an application with respect to the denial of humanitarian assistance. 
Crimes against humanity 
Having previously been under a certain debate, it would seem that the issue of definition of 
crimes against humanity has been settled through the Rome Statute since it is expressed in 
the Art 7 of that instrument by and large as it is acknowledged in customary international 
law140:  
 
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: 
 
                                                 
134 Ibid., para.442 
135 Ibid., para.1119 
136 Art 4(b) 
137 Jean Pictet et al., ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p.1374, para.4536 
138 Ibid., p.1374, para.4535 
139 Jean Pictet et al., ICRC Commentary on the Forth  Geneva Convention, p.225 
140 Cassese in Cassese, Gaeta, Jones, ed. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary, vol.I, 
Oxford, 2002, p.373. 
According to customary international law, the widespread or systematic attack must be based 
on a policy by a State, an organization or a group141. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY has 
confirmed, however, that such a policy does not necessarily need to be adopted formally by 
the perpetrating actor and can be deduced from the way it occurs142. This excludes random 
acts hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid provided that such acts are not aimed at 
having widespread consequences: targeting of strategic objects may very well affect a vast 
group of people143. Concerning humanitarian assistance, this can be the case if the security of 
only a few aid workers is menaced (c.f. above on the content of denial of humanitarian aid). 
 
Apart from murder, the obstruction of relief actions might constitute several crimes against 
humanity as defined in the Rome Statute, e.g.: extermination (Art 7(1)(b)); torture (Art 
7(1)(f)); persecution (Art 7(1)(h)) and; inhumane acts (Art 7(1)(k). It must be noted that the 
definition of the Rome Statute requires – in addition to normal intent of the underlying 
crime as such – knowledge of the larger context as described above in which that crime is 
committed144. 
 
Representing customary international law145, the crime against humanity of extermination is 
further specified in Art 7(2)(b) of the Rome Statute as including the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine. Such deprivation 
must be calculated by the perpetrator to bring about the destruction of a part of a 
population. As concerns the mens rea covering that consequence, Art 30(2)(b) of the Rome 
Statute stipulates that the person behind the crime must mean to cause the destruction of a 
part of the population or that the person is “aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events”. 
 
In its judgment in Krstić, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY found that the “creation of a 
humanitarian crisis” was the “prelude to the forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim 
                                                 
141 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgement 7 May 1997, para. 
654. This part of the Trial Chamber’s judgement was not subject to appeal. 
142 Ibid., para. 653. See also Cassese op.cit., p.361. 
143 Prosecutor v. Mile Msksić, et al. Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Case No. IT-95-13-R61, (Trial Chamber), 3 April 1996, para. 30 
144 Cassese, op.cit. p.363 
145 Ibid. p. 373; as opposed to other parts of the Rome Statute, e.g. Art 7(1)(g) and 7(1)(i), see p.376. 
civilians”146, and that it, combined with crimes of terror and forcible transfers, incurred 
individual responsibility for inhumane acts and persecution as crimes against humanity under 
Article 5(h) and (i) together with Article 7 of the Statute of the ICTY147. The ICTY found 
evidence for this through inter alia the ‘Directive 7’ of 8 March 1995 issued by the Supreme 
Command of the forces of the Republika Srpska, (the Serbian province of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) in which its President, Radovan Karadžić, instructed that the Bosnian Serb 
Army was to: 
 
[B]y planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total 
insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica148. 
 
This included blocking aid convoys: 
 
The relevant State and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian 
organizations shall, through planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit 
the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the 
Muslim population, making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding 
condemnation by the international community and international public opinion149.  
 
The impeding of humanitarian assistance has thus formed part of perpetrations of crimes 
against humanity150. 
Genocide 
Codified in 1948 through the Genocide Convention151 and found verbatim in the Rome 
Statute, the crime of genocide is regarded as the most atrocious international crime. Care 
should therefore be taken not to dilute its gist by applying it to situations which do not 
amount to the required threshold. 
 
                                                 
146 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgement 2 August 2001, para.615 
147 Ibid. para.653 
148 Ibid. para.28 
149 Ibid. 
150 The obstruction of humanitarian aid is also part of the Prosecutor’s allegations on persecutions in the 
Milošević case, see para.35(k) of the in the indictment concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 November 
2001, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54. 
151 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved by the UNGA 9 
December 1948 (resolution 260 A (III)) and entered into force 12 January 1951. 
According to Art II of the Genocide Convention, genocide is any of the acts enumerated in 
that convention committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such. This provision stipulates a special intent, dolus specialis, to 
the effect that the perpetrator must have the clear intent to cause the offence charged152, and 
that this mens rea must cover the will to destroy the group or a distinct part thereof as such, 
as opposed to an accumulation of isolated individuals within it153. The ICTR has pronounced 
that this special intent can be inferred in the view of the factual circumstances under which 
the alleged crimes took place.154  
 
The particular offences in Art II of the Genocide Convention by which genocide could be 
committed through the impediment of humanitarian aid seem to be the “causing of serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group” and the “deliberate infliction on the group 
of conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”. 
As for the latter alternative, which seems to be the one closest to the hindering of relief 
actions, the ICTR has given the example of subjecting a group of people to a subsistence 
diet and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirement155. 
 
In sum, the obstruction of humanitarian assistance could certainly constitute the actus reus of 
several crimes against international law, also in non-international situations. Thus, in those of 
these situations where the impediment is undertaken with the required intent, the 
responsible agents of the relevant authorities are clearly under an individual obligation not to 
refuse the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
                                                 
152 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.518 
153 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgement 2 August 2001, para.590 
154 Akayesu, op.cit., para.523 
155 Ibid., para. 506 
Chapter III – Rights and obligations 
 
This, third chapter, will elaborate on the rights and obligations of the different actors in the 
situations relevant to this paper. 
 
So far, two cases have been discerned where the denial to receive relief actions is not 
permitted in non-international armed conflicts, namely: 1) when the denial constitutes an 
arbitrary refusal, contrary to a certain interpretation of Art 18 APII and; 2) when the denial 
forms part of the perpetration of an international crime. 
 
Before moving on to specific rights and obligations, the different actors in the cases to 
which this paper pertains must be distinguished. These cases inherently include at least three 
parties: one party suffering from the lack of provisions essential to its survival, another one 
withholding its consent to the delivery of humanitarian aid aimed to ease the first party’s 
distress and a third party offering such relief, but being hindered in pursuing its objective by 
the second party. Two additional actors may also be discerned, namely a second belligerent 
and a party enforcing the relief action. Occasionally – some might say unfortunately – the 
borders between these actors may be blurry, especially the one differing humanitarian 
organizations offering aid from actors willing to enforce it. The evident questions relevant to 
all these parties in relation to the delivery of humanitarian assistance are: what are their 
respective obligations; in relation to whom and; when do these obligations emerge? 
Actors and their rights and obligations 
 
Both situations 1) and 2) above would entail that a negative obligation rests upon a 
belligerent party or its individual representative: an obligation to allow for humanitarian aid 
to be distributed when reasonable. As for breaches of APII, that responsibility applies as 
mentioned according to Art 1 APII “in all circumstances”, notwithstanding reciprocity.  
 
Naturally, the ultimate beneficiary of this negative obligation is the civilian population in 
need. However, before letting this lead to the pinpointing of a right to humanitarian 
assistance for civilian populations in the two mentioned cases according to humanitarian law, 
some caution must be observed. In general terms, Provost argues that, in contrast to human 
rights law, humanitarian law does not confer rights upon individuals, but rather 
obligations156. He bases this primarily on the fact that humanitarian law applies in extra-
ordinary circumstances in which the vast majority of human rights may be suspended and in 
which the individual rights-holders are powerless and vulnerable157. According to him, 
humanitarian law is therefore not well suited for an individual rights-based approach. On the 
other hand, it might firstly be said that the existence of an obligation by definition requires 
the existence of a corresponding right. Secondly, and more specifically concerning relief 
actions, a right to access to humanitarian assistance derived from humanitarian law would 
not be ‘universal’ in the same sense as a human right. The former would namely be 
dependent on that a number of factual circumstances – specific to the individuals concerned 
– could be shown, e.g. that they are being persecuted or that other illegal reasons are at hand 
causing them to starve. Consequently, other civilians in other situations could starve because 
of their State’s denial to accept humanitarian aid without enjoying a right to such aid 
according to humanitarian law, because their State’s refusal had been in compliance with that 
law under the circumstances in their specific case. Perhaps it will meet with fewer obstacles 
to argue for a right of the civilian population in cases where the denial in fact constitutes an 
international crime as described above rather than a non-compliance with a more or less 
well-founded interpretation of Art 18 APII. Thirdly, it might be generally argued that 
individuals can merely initiate their rights whereas other actors must be invested with the 
powers to enforce these rights; any other way would lead to anarchy. Finally, as for 
humanitarian law, the jurisprudence and really the mere establishment of the international 
criminal tribunals – the International Criminal Court (ICC)158, ICTY, ICTR, the Special 
                                                 
156 Provost op.cit., p. 97-98. Provost also argues that this difference is inherent in ”the vastly different realities 
which human rights and humanitarian law norms seek to address”, p.116. His differentiation for the purpose of 
a discussion of rights and obligations seems to be based on pragmatic considerations, rather than formal ones. 
Other authors advocate the contrary view that a general difference between humanitarian law and human rights 
law ”s’établit sur des considérations formelles plutôt que sur des raisons de fond”, see Dupuy op.cit., at p.29. It 
is true that the GCs are written in a manner that prohibits States from undertaking certain actions, as opposed 
to granting individuals certain rights which in turn would result in the illegality of State actions violating these 
rights. 
157 Provost op.cit., p.116. It is worth noticing that human rights are still applicable in armed conflicts (if not 
suspended), as ruled by the ICJ in the case Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ICJ Reports 1996, 
p.240). 
158 Out of the international criminal tribunals, the ICC is the most important representative of what many call a 
step towards a new international legal system, out of reach for State sovereignty. That system would be more of 
Court for Sierra Leone159 and the Special Tribunal for Cambodia160 – testifies to the fact that 
individuals can bear responsibility under humanitarian law. Persons convicted by these 
institutions have been so due to their non-compliance with rules protecting other 
individuals.  
 
The principal question of the existence of a right to humanitarian assistance for civilian 
populations may as such be of less interest in a practical context161, seeing that the pressing 
part of the problem is the enforcement of adherence to the above mentioned obligation to 
accept the aid (and, indeed, that is rarely a task for which the civilian population in need is 
well suited). Although it is generally true that in international law, many rights are lacking a 
proper remedy and that only a few can be forcibly implemented162, it remains that in cases of 
provision of humanitarian aid, relief has been enforced. Thus, the maxim ‘no right without 
remedy’ in its reverse supports an individual right to humanitarian assistance according to 
international humanitarian law. Then again, the actions where such remedy has been 
undertaken may prove to have been more or less in accordance with international law; the 
fact that a right has been illegally remedied cannot sustain its legality. Furthermore, it must 
be said that States may prove less hesitant in advocating a right to humanitarian assistance as 
long they themselves are not likely to be the subjects of its corresponding obligation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
a Kantian model as opposed to the classical, Grotius one, as Antonio Cassese argues in ”A Big Step Forward 
for International Justice”, Crimes of War project, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-cassese.html , 
and be more based on individual rights than on States. 
159 Contrary to the ICTY and ICTR which were established pursuant to UNSC resolutions (ICTY by 
S/RES/827 of 25 May 1993 and ICTR by S/RES/955 of 8 November 1994), this court was put in place 
through an agreement between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone in Freetown 16 January 2002. It is 
invested with the power to bring to justice those who bear the greatest respinsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996, Art 1 of the agreement. 
160 This tribunal was established through an agreement between the UN and the Cambodian government 17 
March 2003 to try former Khmer Rouge leaders. Due to the tensions between the Indonesian government and 
UN’s Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) as well as and allegations of partiality on behalf of the ad hoc 
human rights court set up by that government, the judicial procedures for East Timor has been left out of this 
comparison. 
161 Nevertheless, the issue of a general right to humanitarian assistance is surely of great principal value, 
especially in a long term perspective, and as such it may also be of practical interest, but a discussion upon it 
seems better placed within the field of human rights. Efforts with great value and importance have been made 
to codify a right to humanitarian assistance, e.g. by the San Remo Institute through its Guiding Principles on the 
Right to Humanitarian Assistance (see above under Principles). 
162 As argued by Nico Krisch “Review Essay: Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention 
after Kosovo”, in European Journal of International Law, vol.13, no.1, February 2002 (a European-American 
Dialogue Co-sponsored by the University of Michigan Law School and the EJIL), p.326-327. 
In this context, and in the light of the erga omnes nature of humanitarian law, the belligerents’ 
obligations might be seen as one pertaining to the international community as a whole. This 
may not be interpreted to the effect that each and every State is under an obligation to 
provide relief aid to civilians embroiled in any armed conflict wherever it is raging163, but 
rather so as to be part of a justification for States of the international community to take 
measures to deliver humanitarian aid; the rationale perhaps gives the States a possibility 
(which will be discussed below), not an obligation in law.  
 
This leads us to the rights of the humanitarian organizations, that is, the party providing the 
aid. Art 18 APII confers upon these actors a ‘right of initiative’. One interpretation of that 
article entails, as shown, that the belligerents cannot arbitrarily refuse the assistance of these 
organizations. In line with that argument, in their capacity of possessors of the element 
critical to the whole problem – the aid – Art 18 APII in fact gives humanitarian 
organizations an auxiliary right to access the victims in need. In any case, it follows from the 
Nicaragua case that these organizations would not engage in an illegal act by providing the aid 
in these situations164. This right to access would differ from that of the civilian individuals 
(discussed above) in that it is not the beneficiary right of the belligerents’ negative obligation, 
but the link through which the latter can meet their duties. 
 
It has been concluded above when discussing the criteria defining humanitarian assistance 
that a humanitarian organization is defined by its human, impartial and neutral qualities. 
Moreover, it was argued that the assuming of a non-humanitarian organization of the role 
and rights of a humanitarian organization for the purpose of enforcing a relief action is 
almost certain to breach the principle of neutrality and impartiality since the enforcer would 
have to take sides in the conflict, at least to the extent that one of the belligerents refuses the 
aid being delivered. Although this has not always been the case in reality (e.g. UNHCR and 
NATO in Kosovo), a distinction between enforcers and providers of humanitarian aid 
would thus seem vital for both legal reasons in order to minimize possibilities for non-
humanitarian players to act under humanitarian flag in pursuing strategic goals as well as for 
                                                 
163 Dinstein, op.cit. mentions this in relation to civilians’ rights to demand relief and he contends that such an 
obligation upon every State would be absurd. Notwithstanding any irrationality of such an obligation, it does 
not seem probable that States would accept it, seeing the cost of risk assessment it would entail. 
164 Para.242 
practical reasons in order not to impair the confidence of humanitarian organizations on the 
ground. 
 
As concerns the belligerent parties’ obligations between themselves, this is obviously the 
core of the problem and often the ultimate reason why access to humanitarian assistance is 
denied. APII lacks any provisions on free passage, equivalent to Art 23 GC IV. Seeing that 
the warring factions in non-international conflicts ‘share’ the civilian population and that Art 
18 APII applies to both the State party and the insurgent, a provision on free passage seems 
to be superfluous in this context. 
 
Now turning to the question from which point in time belligerents would find themselves 
under an obligation to accept humanitarian assistance, the negative nature of the obligation 
must be appreciated: an obligation to accept, not to undertake. Logically, the obligation could 
thus not emerge before the time the aid is offered. Equally logical, the pre-requisites for any 
of the point 1) or 2) above would have to be fulfilled. 
The humanitarian imperative 
 
The ‘humanitarian imperative’ is a very broad notion which is often mentioned with respect 
to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the rights and obligations linked to it. It finds 
its base in natural law, from where it claims universality and classic scholars have derived it 
from the ‘pity’ or compassion of humans for their fellow men, especially the weaker ones165. 
It is frequently expressed through the medium of human rights. Unfortunately, history and 
today’s world prove empathy and other virtues to be rare qualities in men. In fact voracious 
preying to achieve egoistical aspirations and the ‘survival of the fittest’ seems to be the 
predominant instinct of humans as well as States. Agreeing, nevertheless, that the 
humanitarian imperative is profitable for mankind, durable, functional and realistic solutions 
                                                 
165 See J.J. Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les hommes, 1753, part I: ”En effet, qu’est-ce que la 
générosité, la clémence, l’humanité, sinon la pitié appliquée aux faibles, aux coupables, ou à l’espèce humaine en 
général?” He argues that nature has given this quality to man, from which ”découlent toutes les vertues 
sociales”. Another view holds, in contrast to this, that all human relations are founded on egoism. What 
Rousseau calls ’pity’ is then in fact only a fear of what could happen to oneself, and help is only given to the 
weaker when the stronger finds that it serves his own purposes or when compelled by someone even stronger 
to do so, who in his turn has something to gain from it. 
for its integration in an ‘evil world’166, as opposed to a naïve reliance on human pity, must be 
found: as concerns humanitarian assistance, these include first and foremost finding 
compelling reasons for States to accept it. This fitting of humanitarian aid in the present 
system of world affairs will be treated in the following Chapters. 
                                                 
166 This is an ancient task with which religion to a great extent is concerned, (for example, the Ten 
Commandments would be superfluous if man was good), but which has been viciously abused and misused for 
the purposes of the very greedy instincts it was set out to hamper. As will be argued below, enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance also unleashes great powers, and extra-ordinary care must be taken in order for it not 
to be abused for other purposes than easing urgent human suffering. 
 Part Two – Enforcement 
 
 
 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
A frequently quoted observation of the relations between the members of the ‘global village’ 
is that: 
 
Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law, and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time167. 
 
There are different factors pulling States towards such compliance. Naturally, it is important 
that States perceive the rules of international law as legitimate. But many decisions on 
whether to comply with these rules or not are made by States on the basis of a pragmatic 
estimate of their international political, economic and military ‘balance sheets’. The State will 
ask itself if would be worth the costs (e.g. bad reputation and diminished trade) of not 
complying with a certain rule168. In an increasingly inter-dependent world the costs for non-
compliance can be high, although the outcome of the assessment will differ between States 
and depend on the relevant State’s political, economic and military strength relatively other 
States. Even though it is thus true that compliance with the rules of international law is high, 
the robustness of a specific rule would only be truly appraised when the rule was not 
respected. In situations where an antisocial player on the international arena does not follow 
the rules or takes advantage of them (a ‘free rider’), the need for means and rules of 
enforcement becomes evident. That is, the question of what measures can be taken and by 
                                                 
167 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, New York, 1979, p.47 
168 Henkin himself embraces this pragmatic view, ibid. p.51. See also generally on factors entailing compliance 
Cramér, op.cit., pp.36-38 
whom in order to increase the costs for a State violating a legitimate international rule will be 
posed. 
 
As implied on several occasions above, the delivery of humanitarian assistance is an 
intrinsically practical issue. In fact, the very existence of a right to provide relief, or to receive 
it, might be regarded as void without any means to implement it169. This is not to say that 
rules in general necessarily are null without a real possibility to enforce them, since that is the 
case concerning a large number of provisions under international law in general and 
humanitarian law rules which are not subject to reciprocity in particular170. However, the 
means and level of enforcement of rules can vary, and range from moral sensations of 
obligation to comply with a certain rule, over imposed motivation (e.g. through political 
pressure), to outright force (e.g. through sanctions or armed persuasions). The proving of a 
possibility that action can be put behind words would seem important especially when a 
right to receive or to provide humanitarian assistance is deducted from a relatively broad 
interpretation of Art 18 APII, as opposed to a proposed right according to the relatively 
clear and accepted rules on the international crimes discussed above. Individual rights 
conferred by the latter are naturally strengthened by firm implementation. 
 
Furthermore, it might be much more difficult for a belligerent to gather political 
international support for its withholding access to humanitarian organizations if it is 
apparent that the refusal is part of the perpetration of a ‘clear’ crime against the civilian 
population. Conversely, that belligerent might find itself in a more favorable situation should 
the denying of access ‘only’ be illegal because it did not qualify as valid reasons for refusal 
according to an interpretation Art 18 APII, the consensus on which is uncertain.  
 
Thus, the area in which the issue of enforcement would seem to be of special interest is the 
one within which the only prohibition of the refusal to accept the humanitarian aid is Art 18 
APII, out of reach for the ‘clear’ international crimes. Seeing that a right within this zone still 
                                                 
169 The aforementioned Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance clearly accounts for a 
possible enforcement of humanitarian aid when it states in Principle 6 that “States and organizations concerned 
may undertake all necessary steps” to ensure access to victims if an offer of relief is refused. 
170 Luigi Condorelli, “Intervention humanitaire et/ou assistance humanitaire? Quelques certitudes et beaucoup 
d’interrogations” in International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law, Al-Naumi 
and Meese, ed., p.1009. 
would prevail over State sovereignty and entail the use of force if necessary, some actors 
might find other than purely humanitarian reasons to invoke it. The enforcement of that 
right would thus be very attractive to abuse. However, also an implementation action 
undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons would meet with obstacles because it by 
necessity implies the possibility of use of force against one or more parties to the armed 
conflict. 
 
An implementation action of humanitarian assistance would first and foremost include 
measures for a secure passage of humanitarian organizations to access the victims and, once 
in place – be it within ‘human corridors’ or ‘safe havens’ – protective measures in order for 
the relief to be satisfactory carried out. In order to retain whatever neutrality and confidence 
that can be saved, even after a non-abused enforcement action, the aid as such should be 
distributed by the humanitarian organizations in clear distinction from the enforcing agents. 
In certain situations, for example if the convoys or distribution in situ of assistance to the 
victims on the ground experience constant and/or heavy military attacks, such distinction 
will naturally be very hard to uphold. Furthermore, a certain ‘spill-over’ effect on the ground 
would also seem close to inevitable whenever relief would have to be enforced as the 
presence of the humanitarian organizations would be associated with the forcible measures 
taken to implement the aid. But the point made is that the distribution of the aid should not, 
to the greatest extent possible, be overtaken and carried out by the armed forces used to 
implement it; these should instead abide by their task of making way for the humanitarian 
agents. In fact, the use of the humanitarian efforts for any other reasons than distributing the 
aid should not be envisaged in order not to stain the reputation of humanitarian agents as 
others than pure helpers171. 
 
In circumstances like those above, the adjacent problem of refugees and in some cases 
forcible deportations must be mentioned. For practical reasons and the safety of all parties, it 
might seem advisable to transport the victims to the aid and out of reach for its adversaries, 
instead of continuing a hazardous and costly enterprise of bringing the aid to the victims. In 
                                                 
171 Donini, op.cit., p.41 suggests that the negotiations of humanitarian organizations – humanitarian diplomacy – 
could successfully be used to open up areas to a political or peace process. But if it becomes known that talks 
with humanitarian agents might have political consequences, many insurgents might be reluctant to even enter 
into negotiations on the distribution on assistance. 
response to such a suggestion some remarks can be made. Firstly, it may serve the objectives 
of an authority pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing or other strategy involving forcible 
deportation. Such authority would then have achieved its goal of deporting civilians from its 
territory by persistently impeding humanitarian aid; this is certainly an easier and less 
burdening enterprise for it to undertake than that of removing the relevant parts of the 
population by its own means. Secondly, notwithstanding any deportation policy, such a 
suggestion might menace the confidence on the ground for the humanitarian action, at least 
inasmuch as the victims are reluctant to leave. Finally, the hosting of the civilians thus 
removed out of harms way may meet with some hesitance from receiving countries who 
might consider themselves having fulfilled their quota of an already existing exodus of 
refugees due to a civil war. 
 
It must be noted that enforcement consisting of only ‘protective forces’ accompanying the 
relief action is equally relevant to the present study since such implementation still would 
entail the use of force when necessary for the access. 
 
For the purposes of the present essay, the enforcement of delivery of humanitarian aid must 
been seen in the light of the debate on humanitarian intervention172. In fact, as Condorelli 
elegantly points out: humanitarian needs entail obligations of humanitarian assistance 
(‘primary norms’) whereas humanitarian intervention, in its capacity of a reaction to 
violations of these obligations, stems from a paradigm of norms (‘secondary norms’) 
regulating the enforcement of those obligations173. The implementation of a right to 
humanitarian assistance according to international humanitarian law could surely form part 
of an action of humanitarian intervention. Part One of this paper was thus concerned with 
‘primary norms’, whereas the present Part will evaluate the ‘secondary’ ones, of which 
humanitarian intervention constitutes a centre piece. 
Humanitarian intervention 
 
                                                 
172 Condorelli op.cit., p.1008 frames it well when noting that in situations where the affected State does give its 
consent to the humanitarian assistance one needs only talk about ”assistance” whereas it makes sense to discuss 
”l’”intervention humanitaire” lorsqu’il s’agit de définir quelles sont les mesures pouvant être adoptées afin de 
réagir contre l’impossibilité d’apporter l’assistance, causées par des obstacles venant de l’Etat affecté”. 
173 Condorelli, op.cit., at p.1002. 
 L’obligation de non-ingérence s’arrête à l’endroit précis où naît le risque de non-assistance174. 
 
The concept of what has become known as ‘humanitarian intervention’ (intervention 
humanitaire or ingérence humanitaire) has, especially during the re-awakening of the UNSC after 
the end of the Cold War, been the subject of considerable academic and political debate but 
its exact scope of application remains uncertain and in all cases of humanitarian intervention 
its rules and principles have been improvised175. This holds true both as far as on what basis 
intervention should be undertaken and by whom is concerned176. However, there is a relative 
certitude in saying that humanitarian intervention comprises interference by an outside actor 
in the internal affairs of a State in order to alleviate human suffering of that State’s own 
nationals, without its consent and by the unilateral use of force if necessary. Humanitarian 
intervention thus stands in direct contrast to the jus cogens rule177 – embodied in Art 2(4) of 
the Charter of the United Nations and in Principle 1 of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations178 – on the prohibition of the use of armed force, unless deployed for self-defense 
according to Art 51 of the UN Charter or authorized by the UNSC under Chapter VII of 
that Charter. Humanitarian intervention is seen a basis for the use force additional to these 
provisions. Its supporters find ground for this derogation primarily in moral considerations; 
according to them, there are situations of human suffering that so profoundly chock the 
conscience of mankind that action must be taken without delay and that human lives in such 
cases cannot be sacrificed on the altar of State sovereignty179. Albeit not pertaining 
exclusively to the obstruction of humanitarian aid, the horrible tragedies of the 1995 
                                                 
174 François Mitterand, 30 May 1989, quoted in Mario Bettati, “Ingérence, Intervention ou Assistance 
Humanitaire?” in International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law, Al-Naumi 
and Meese, ed., p.941 
175 Jovica Patrnogic, “Humanitarian Assistance – Humanitarian Intervention” in International Legal Issues Arising 
Under the United Nations Decade of International Law, Al-Naumi and Meese, ed., p.1027 
176 Human Rights Watch – an NGO in principle supporting humanitarian intervention as being justified in the 
face of an ongoing or imminent genocide or comparable mass slaughter – looks to five factors when faced with 
such a situation in order to determine whether the use of force can be characterized as humanitarian: 1) the use 
of force should be the very last reasonable option to stop the slaughter; 2) humanitarianism should be the 
dominant reason for the intervention; 3) the means used must respect humanitarian law and human rights law; 
4) it must be reasonably likely that military action will do more good that harm; and 5) UNSC endorsement of 
the humanitarian intervention is preferable, but not mandatory, see Ken Roth, ”War in Iraq: Not a 
Humanitarian Intervention”, in Human Rights Watch World Report 2004. 
177 See e.g. Yoram Dinstein, War, Agression and Self-Defense, Cambridge, 1988, pp.98-103. 
178 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/8018 (1970). 
179 See e.g. Tesòn who argues that governments who violate basic human rights undermine the one reason that 
justifies their political power; State sovereignty is an instrumental, not an intrinsic, value. See Fernando R. 
Tesòn “The liberal case for humanitarian intervention” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Cambridge 2003, p.93 
massacre in Srebrenica and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda are all too recent reminders of 
catastrophes that might have been prevented had the international community not failed to 
react when faced with compelling warnings of imminent human disasters. 
 
Seeing the complexity of conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Rwanda, some might argue 
that the situation when civilian victims of war are starving on one side of a border and 
foodstuffs are offered to them on the other but being refused delivery is a relatively basic 
example of when a State should not be able to hide behind sovereign rights. As will be seen, 
however, even this, on the surface uncomplicated, situation might be a gate to wider, and 
sometimes more ambitious, consequences beyond the mere distribution of humanitarian 
assistance if the enforcement of the aid is not subject to clear rules. 
 
Below, a few examples of humanitarian intervention will be given, including a brief analysis 
of the Kosovo crisis, and the alleged inconsistency between State sovereignty and morality 
will be discussed. 
Examples of humanitarian intervention 
 
There are old examples of the substance of and reasoning behind humanitarian intervention: 
 
I approve […] decidedly of the opinion of those who say that the cause of the Spaniards is just when 
they make war upon the Indians, who practiced abominable lewdness even with beasts, and who ate 
human flesh, slaying men for that purpose. For such sins are contrary to human nature180. 
 
These were words of justification for the Spanish conquest of the New World and illustrate 
well the dilemma facing the notion of humanitarian intervention. 
 
During the 20th century, there are several cases which have been used as examples of more 
or less legitimate intervention on humanitarian grounds e.g.: USA. in Lebanon 1958; Belgium 
in Congo 1964; USA in the Dominican Republic 1965; India in East Pakistan 1978 and; 
                                                 
180 A. Gentilli, De iure belli libri tres (J.C. Rolfe trans., 1933) 122, quoted in Krisch op.cit., p.324. 
Vietnam interference against the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 1979181. More 
recent examples are, amongst others: the exclusion zone for the Kurds in Iraq in 1991; 
Somalia in 1992; Yugoslavia from 1992; Albania in 1997182 and; Kosovo in 1999. It seems 
that developing countries may be more exposed to such humanitarian intervention than 
developed countries183. 
 
As will be seen below when examining States as enforcers of humanitarian aid, an argument 
of a right to humanitarian intervention can be one of many invoked by the intervening party, 
alongside and intertwined with the notions of ‘material breach’ and ‘implied UNSC 
authorization’. As for the examples given above, it can be said that Vietnam did not justify 
its invasion as humanitarian and to the extent that India did, its intervention was 
condemned184 (Kosovo will be discussed in detail below). In line with this, many authors 
argue against the use of earlier cases as precedents because of what they were ‘in essence’ 
rather than what the acting States invoked as justification at the time185. 
 
The now more or less classical example of unilateral intervention by a coalition of States in 
contemporary times is the NATO bombing campaign of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in March 1999, ‘Operation Allied Force’. Just as the no-fly zones in northern Iraq, 
this action was to a large extent undertaken to enforce humanitarian assistance186. In its 
resolution 1199, the UNSC affirmed that the “deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region”, and 
acted under Chapter VII when it demanded the FRY to inter alia “allow free and unimpeded 
access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo”187, but it never authorized 
“all necessary means” to ensure these demands. The ongoing war and the impediment of 
                                                 
181 Examples from Bettati, op.cit. at p.952, note 33. 
182 S/RES/1080 authorized Member States to use all means necessary to facilitate the return of humanitarian 
organizations and the delivery of humanitarian aid, but the force was in fact never deployed. 
183 Jovica Patrnogic, op.cit. at p.1019 
184 Mary Ellen O’Connell ”The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo” in Human Rights Quarterly, 
vol.22 (2000), no.1, p.71 
185 Krisch, op.cit., p.326 with reference to Simon Chesterman, Just War of Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.85 and Christine Gray, International 
Law and the Use of Force, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.18. 
186 The NATO Secretary-General stated the 13th October 1998 that the FRY “has still not complied fully with” 
S/RES/1199. 
187 S/RES/1199 of 23 September 1998. Preamble, para.14 and op.4(c). 
humanitarian assistance indeed had created a disastrous humanitarian situation in Kosovo in 
1998, and it would depreciate even more as winter was coming. On the 13th of October 
1998, NATO decided to authorize the use of force in Yugoslavia, and on the 24th of March 
1999 it began its air strikes, without any authorization from the UNSC. As opposed to a 
unilateral intervention by only one or two countries, this action was collectively undertaken 
by the 19 Member States of NATO, at least formally, since the organization’s decision-
making is based on consensus188. In this context it may be noted that the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ supporting USA and UK in their enterprise in Iraq in March 2003 was far from 
representing a majority of the world community (in fact, the majority was against the 
invasion), that the countries of the coalition did not participate in the decision to use armed 
force and that only a minority of them has actually contributed militarily to that intervention. 
 
The NATO action naturally ignited a fierce debate on its legality189, and FRY pursued the ten 
NATO Member States active in the bombing campaign individually before the ICJ for 
breaches of international law including the use of force, intervention in the internal affairs of 
another State, the Genocide Convention, API as well as environmental law and human 
rights190. At the ICJ, the USA brought forth inter alia, “the humanitarian catastrophe” and 
“the resolutions of the Security Council” taken under Chapter VII as justification for the 
NATO action191. Belgium argued that not only did the anterior UNSC resolutions provide 
sound legal basis for the intervention, but that it was obliged to intervene, in order to 
prevent a humanitarian disaster and to safeguard “des valeurs essentielles” which rank as jus 
                                                 
188 See NATO Handbook (2001), Chapter 7, available at www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm visited 
on 10 December 2003 
189 See e.g. the utterly partial, but (and perhaps because of its partiality) interesting collection of contributions to 
the International Symposium held in Novi Sad on the 15th-16th of October 1999 by the Association for Legal 
Theory and Practice Novi Sad, NATO Aggression on the FR Yugoslavia ’99, Proceedings, Novi Sad, March 2000. 
190 Legality of Use of Force, (Yugoslavia v. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
UK, USA), 29 April 1999. The cases against USA and Spain were dismissed in June 1999. USA did not consent 
to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in this case, which is a pre-requisite for the Court to consider a case according to 
Art 38(5) of the Rules of the Court (which are elaborated pursuant to Art 30 of the ICJ’s Statute) and as for 
FRY’s invoking of Art IX of the Genocide Convention, the USA did not give its specific consent to its 
application, which is a condition according to a reservation made by the USA to that Convention. Under the 
terms of a reservation, Spain does not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to disputes to which 
the other party has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court less than 12 months prior to the filing of its 
application, and Spain has a reservation similar to that of the USA to Art IX of the Genocide Convention. 
191 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. USA), Verbatim records of oral pleadings on the Request for the 
indication of provisional measures, 11 May 1999, para.1.7 
cogens192. The UNSG did not condemn the bombings, but instead contended that “normally a 
UN Security Council Resolution is needed”193. UNHCR, active in Kosovo, made an official 
request to NATO in April 1999 for assistance with the humanitarian aid operation194 (see 
above under Neutrality). Naturally, the ICJ has not rendered any decision on the issue yet, 
but it has pronounced itself being “profoundly concerned with the use of force in 
Yugoslavia”, which “under the present circumstances [...] raises very serious issues of 
international law”195. 
 
The NATO intervention was clearly in violation of the UN Charter as no UNSC 
authorization was at hand, and there was no overwhelming support for it from the 
international community196, although the humanitarian situation might have engendered 
understanding for the action, as expressed by the acting of the UNSG and UNHCR. Many 
of the NATO member governments themselves concluded that the organization’s decision 
should not be seen as a precedent197. Moreover, in spring 2000 the Havana Declaration of 
the Group of 77 made clear that there was no acceptance of humanitarian intervention by 
the world community198. Thus, even accepting the notion of ‘instant international custom’ – 
which as such appears as a contradiction in terms, rendering the usus part of any customary 
international rule unfulfilled199 – such a rule could not have emerged from the Kosovo 1999 
                                                 
192 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Verbatim records of oral pleadings on the Request for the 
indication of provisional measures, 10 May 1999. 
193 Mary Ellen O’Connell ”The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo” in Human Rights Quarterly, 
vol.22 (2000), no.1, p.82. 
194 Porter, op.cit.,p.4 
195 See e.g. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) Order on the Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, 2 June 1999, para.16. 
196 O’Connell, op.cit., p.85 
197 See Bruno Simma, ”NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”, European Journal of International 
Law, vol.10 (1999), no.1, p.20. Simma argues that ”the genie of NATO self-authorization must not be let out of 
its bottle”. The then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that Kosovo was ”a unique situation sui generis 
in the region of the Balkans” and that it is important ”not to overdraw the various lessons that come out of it”. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasized the exceptional nature of the air campaign. See Michael Byers and 
Simon Chesterman, ”Changing the Rules About Rules?: Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future 
of International Law” in Holzgrefe and Keohane, op.cit., p.199. 
198 The Group of 77 which has 135 Member States, thus representing a majority of the international 
community, rejected “the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United 
Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law”, para.54 of the Declaration of the Group of 77 
South Summit held in Havana from 10 to 14 of April 2000, available at 
www.g77.org/Docs/Declaration_G77Summit.htm visited on 1 March 2004. 
199 Without embarking on the debate on instant custom, it must only be mentioned that something which is 
customary logically and literally implies a repetition of facts; it takes at least two points to draw a line – and 
preferably one more to confirm that the second dot was not faulty. This is also the classical view of public 
action; the international community’s response to the US invasion of Afghanistan, 
conducted in ‘pre-emptive self-defense’ following the September 11 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, gives a better standard of the amount of international 
support required for the opinio juris of a would-be ‘instant’ rule of customary international 
law. The September 1999 intervention of the Australian-led coalition INTERFET in East 
Timor has been mentioned in the debate as a counter-precedent of the international 
community to the NATO bombings in Kosovo on the grounds that it had the consent of all 
parties as well as UNSC authorization200. This argument is not convincing since a true 
counter-precedent would concern a situation in all its relevant parts similar to that of 
Kosovo, that is not only the fact that human suffering is at hand, which was indeed also the 
case in East Timor. A counter-precedent would be a situation where State consent to the 
action (for example the provision of humanitarian aid) is lacking and where the UNSC is 
unable to act but where the international community still abides by international law. That is 
when the rules would be put to the test. Albeit not a perfect example for the purposes of this 
essay since it concerned the deliberate changing of power in a country where no armed 
conflict was raging nor humanitarian aid hindered201, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 still 
indicates that the world’s leading military and political powers will not hesitate to use force 
unilaterally at their will, notwithstanding international condemnation. 
Consistency between State sovereignty and morality 
 
Much of the debate on humanitarian intervention, especially when it is unilateral, has 
focused on an alleged inconsistency between law and morality. The latter supports forcible 
relief for victims based on fundamental human values such as the right to life whereas the 
former rigidly prohibits this through the firmness of State sovereignty202. However, reliance 
                                                                                                                                                 
international law as to the creation of a rule of customary international law, see e.g Claude Emanuelli, Droit 
International Public, University of Ottawa, 1998, p.43ss. 
200 O’Connell, op.cit., p.85, S/RES/1264 of 15 September 1999. 
201 See below on the humanitarian implications of more than a decade of sanctions imposed on Iraq. Seeing 
that the USA had been particularly in favor of the sanctions regime – which in fact deprived the Iraqi 
population of also very basic supplies because of the ‘dual use’ restrictions – its decision to invade Iraq can 
hardly be justified by the USA as giving free access to humanitarian supplies. 
202 See e.g the conclusion of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report (2000), p.186. 
The yielding of State sovereignty is treated here in the context of giving access to a State’s territory for the 
delivery of relief. Admittedly, the partial giving up of sovereignty to international organizations (such as the UN 
or the EU) in reasonable portions can be profitable. However, such submission is made on a voluntary basis 
on State sovereignty is not necessarily immoral. If one endorses a short time perspective, it is 
true that – lacking non-interfering means to imperatively persuade a State to accept 
humanitarian aid – in certain cases sovereignty will prevail over intervention at the cost of 
human suffering. But in a long term perspective – lacking clear rules and means eliminating 
potential and attractive misuse of the instrument of humanitarian intervention – a relaxation 
of State sovereignty for the benefit of intervention will be at the cost of stability of 
international relations and ultimately peace203. States in a position of relative strength will 
firstly act on the basis of their own moral principles204, in their own interest and seize 
whatever opportunity to enhance their status. To open the legal gate to intervention on 
humanitarian grounds without severe control mechanisms would seem extremely dangerous, 
especially in the current state of world affairs, with one dominant military player who 
moreover constantly shows aspirations of global reach for its economic, political and moral 
ambitions. Since the international community is far from demonstrating a will to be united 
under the same economical, political or moral values (on the contrary), any attempt to 
achieve such blending would seem to be not only in vain, but also entailing internal armed 
uprisings and eventually war. The division of Africa between the colonial powers during the 
Berlin Conference 1885, the disastrous effects of which still linger to this day in the civil 
wars ravaging the continent, is an illustrative example of how blunt Western interests abroad 
have resulted in war in a long term perspective. A recent example of an intervention which 
has been veiled in humanitarian garment as other justifications have proven fruitless which 
subsequently also entailed persistent internal armed resistance is the US-led invasion of Iraq 
in March 2003. At the outset, the proponents of its legality (or at least legitimacy) justified 
the invasion on a variety of grounds, the major one being a threat of weapons of mass 
                                                                                                                                                 
and cannot be forcibly executed. In order for the benefits of this kind of cooperation to be durable, the 
sovereign rights thus transferred to the international organization should be very clearly defined (the lack of 
which is presently a defect of the EU). 
203 See also Krisch, op.cit., p.331 who argues that the question of humanitarian intervention is a matter of choice 
between human rights or peace (and that peace have stronger considerations of justice than State sovereignty 
which in turn renders it a stronger moral argument); for this, he finds contemporary support e.g. in the UN 
Charter which emphasizes the maintenance of peace and he believes that if people have had the choice, they 
would have chosen peace over preservation of their human rights at all times. Through this maneuver, he thus 
lessens the gap between morality and law on the question of unilateral humanitarian intervention: the latter is 
neither moral nor legal because it menaces peace. The present essay goes one step further in that it argues that 
also State sovereignty as such, because of the rationale behind it, namely peace, is moral; the upholding of State 
sovereignty is thus moral and legal (and equally included as a foundation of the UN system). 
204 See Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics, (1984), p.193, who argues that this jeopardizes a peaceful 
and just international order. 
destruction (WMD) in relation to which humanitarian concerns were subordinate. However, 
as time elapsed and no WMDs were found and no link between Saddam Hussein and 
international terrorism had been established, the Bush administration was left with the 
argument of humanitarian intervention: Hussein was a tyrant who deserved to be 
overthrown205. The tending of national interests by the USA and the UK during the whole 
chain of events in the region – the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980’s; the Gulf War in 1991 
(‘Operation Desert Storm’) and subsequently the enforcement of the Kurdish safe areas 
(‘Operation Provide Comfort’); the December 1998 actions to compel Iraq to collaborate 
with UN weapons inspectors (‘Operation Desert Fox’); and the February 2001 forcible 
upholding of the no-fly zones206 – did certainly not render the March 2003 invasion and 
subsequent overthrowing of the Saddam Hussein regime unanticipated207. Although it 
remains to be seen if the armed attacks on the Coalition forces will discontinue after the 
arrest of the dictator in December 2003, the fact still remains that there was ‘a war after the 
war’208. In fact, as of the 27th of January 2004, there have been 58 American casualties after 
the capture of Saddam Hussein; after President Bush proclaimed the end of the war in Iraq 
on the 1st of May 2003, there have been 373 American casualties, of which 242 were combat 
                                                 
205 See Roth, op.cit. As pointed out by Roth, there are many factors testifying to the fact that the intervention 
was not humanitarian in character; for example, had the invading forces been determined to maximize the 
humanitarian influence of the intervention, ”they would have been better prepared to fill the security vacuum 
that predictably was created after the toppling of the Iraqi government”. 
206 There are different hypothesis on the influence of all these years of measures against Iraq. One holds for 
true that the unusually strong coalition that condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequently imposed 
sanctions on Iraq indeed changed international law in many areas, e.g. the use of force and human rights. A 
contrary hypothesis is that the nature of the coalition and its fracturing created a number of neither desirable 
nor sustainable precedents. See ”The Impact on International Law of a Decade of Measures against Iraq”, 
European Journal of International Law, vol.13, no.1, i-ii. 
207 Naturally, the terrirost attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon the 11th September 2001 put 
things in a new perspective for the USA. Cf., for example, Farer’s question in 2002 as to whether the USA 
would employ coercion not directly connected to 9/11 for wider strategic purposes; subsequently, allegations 
were effectively made by the Bush administration of links between Al-Qaeda and the Saddam regime, Tom J. 
Farer, ”Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11” Holzgrefe and Keohane, ed., op.cit., p.87. A recent 
poll by CNN(Gallup) shows that 59 per cent of the American population thinks it ’was worth’ commencing the 
war; analysts believe that, still feeling vulnerable after the September 11 attack, the Americans are not 
susceptible of questionning the reasons for the Iraq invasion, Dagens Nyheter, 22 January 2004, at 
http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=148&a=225778&previousRenderType=1  
208 During the fall of 2003, especially towards its end, reports of the present situation in Iraq made in terms of 
’Iraq guerilla’ war have been more frequent, see e.g. the German Der Spiegel at 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,265052,00.html and the Brittish BBC at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3113417.stm both visited on 22 January 2004. The U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld disagreed during the summer of 2003 that the attacks on the Coalition 
could be defined as ’guerilla war’ under the Pentagon’s definition, (see 
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0306/30/ldt.00.html) but might during the fall have shown some 
inclination to the contrary, see http://www.thetip.org/art_Iraq_Guerilla_War___Rumsfeld_487_icle.html both 
visited on 22 January 2004 (source AP). 
casualties209. The American casualties since the war began numbers 513 of which 354 in 
combat; estimates for the civilian deaths as a cause of the war range between 8041 and 
9878210. This ‘post-war’ is the one over the trust, the confidence and mostly the opinions of 
the population of the territory in which the interference took place211. In this context, it may 
very well be argued that “king-making or imposing democratization is no business for 
outsiders”212; then again, external interests and/or support might equally well hamper any 
internal strife for freedom, which has been the case in many African States. In any case, 
people’s sense of nationality is deeply rooted and territorial losses are not easily forgotten; 
the Israel-Palestine conflict suffices as one gruesome example of this. One can only 
speculate in what armed conflicts future enterprises in disrespect of States’ sovereignty will 
result in, and one can hope that they are not increasing in size and number in spite of the 
fact that the enlarged actual possibilities for military action in pursuance of national interests 
after the Cold War to a great extent have been seized by the major military player in the 
world213 (which might consider itself less concerned by a fear that equal measures will be 
used against itself214). The least to be done in order to curtail this tendency is the 
continuation of State sovereignty, in some areas subjected to the clear rules of peaceful, non-
hierarchical international forums. Wing-clipped through the prohibition of the unilateral use 
of force other than for self-defense, State sovereignty is therefore not only a pragmatic basis 
for international relations, but it is also morally justifiable in that its strict upholding prevents 
war and thus human suffering on a large scale.  
                                                 
209 Source:  http://www.antiwar.com/casualties/ visited on 27 January 2004. 
210 Ibid., http://www.iraqbodycount.net/ visited on 27 January 2004. 
211 This is of course a classical problem for the conqueror of a State noted already in 1513 by Niccolò 
Machiavelli in The Prince, Chapter V. Debated as it is, this cynical oeuvre does not necessarily provide a 
particularly human approach applicable to a discussion on humanitarian assistance; it is here merely used as an 
example of the long term problems of foreign interference in the internal affairs of a State on the one hand, 
and as a reminder of the similarities between the political rationales it endorses and the foreign policy of certain 
powerful contemporary States on the other.  
212 Donini, op.cit., p.38 
213 According to the U.S Defense Department’s Annual Base Structure Report for the fiscal year of 2003, the 
Pentagon own or rents 702 overseas bases in about 130 countries, other sources say the number of bases 
abroad is close to 1000, see Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases”, TomDispatch.com, January 2004, at 
www.nationinstitute.org/tomdispatch/index.mhtml?mm=1&yr=2004 visited on 15 February 2004. 
214 To only superficially exemplify this, there are a number of internationally recognized treaties to which the 
U.S.A is not a party, e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights and the Rome Statute. It is remarkable that the U.S.A, having signed the latter treaty 
in December 2000, ‘unsigned’ it in June 2002. The country is presently exerting pressure on other States to sign 
bilateral treaties with it exempting U.S. military and government personnel from the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Consummation of State sovereignty 
 
There is the view that international relations should be based on individual rights at least 
inasmuch as certain basic rights, e.g. the right to life, are concerned and that authorities that 
do not respect such fundamental rights do not amount to statehood and consequently do 
not profit from sovereignty as concerns those of its acts that menace these rights. Two 
remarks must be made with respect to this. Firstly, there is the evident question of what 
organ should decide when sovereign rights have been thus consumed. But secondly, more 
importantly and notwithstanding the customary stipulations of Art 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention, non-States can also wage war. Moreover, other, ‘real’ States may have political, 
economical or other interests as well as traditional and historical ties to a non-State. Such an 
eventuality therefore immediately takes any intervention by a third State in the affairs of a 
non-State to an inter-state level, which eventually very well might lead to an international war 
involving several States. Thus, a proposed solution to the question of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention which is based on an assumption that sovereignty has not been 
acquired, or that it has been ‘consummated’ if basic human rights are not respected is an 
academic solution to a practical problem. It does not take into account the rationale behind 
the concept of State sovereignty, which, for example the Montevideo Convention does in 
that its exigencies for statehood are strictly pragmatic. Any other way opens the 
aforementioned gate to misuse of intervention which would risk large scale war and is thus 
immoral. 
 
Chapter IV – Enforcement agents 
 
The United Nations as well as States, individually or in concert, have both demanded and 
undertaken implementation of humanitarian aid, invoking different moral and legal grounds 
for their actions. This Chapter provides a modest overview of the practice of the different 
actors. 
 
International tribunals may not be seen as enforcing organisms in the sense of the present 
chapter. They merely conclude that a certain rule of humanitarian law has not been complied 
with, whereas other institutions see to it that the courts’ decisions are carried out in reality, 
much like the case in national legal systems. What is lacking on the international level, 
however, is the equivalence of a police acting on the scene of the crime, maybe even 
preventing the offence from being committed, and functioning in accordance with clear 
rules of conduct. This is of course in line with the ‘flat’ structure of the relations between the 
States within the international community, based on the mutual respect for the sovereignty 
of each of its members. Nevertheless, as will be argued below, international tribunals may 
have an advisory role to play in a prelude to a decision on enforcement. 
 
Humanitarian organizations as such do not seem likely to act in order to forcibly implement 
humanitarian aid since that would menace their neutrality. However, such damage could 
equally occur should their assistance be enforced by another party, since the latter would act 
on behalf of the humanitarian organization. 
 
The United Nations 
The General Assembly 
 
The United Nations is undoubtedly the world’s most important player in the field of 
humanitarian aid215. In his report to the UNSC of the 22nd September 1998, the Secretary-
General endorsed that while “full respect must be shown for the sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity” of States, the “international community should ensure” that 
humanitarian assistance be provided where “States are unable or unwilling to meet their 
responsibilities towards refugees and others in conflict situations”216. In comparison to the 
UNGA resolutions mentioned above under the historical outlook, this report seems less 
reluctant to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance on dispense of State sovereignty. 
However, in its resolution Uniting for Peace of 1950, the UNGA decided that in cases where 
the UNSC “because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” the UNGA 
should “consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures […] including the use of armed force 
when necessary”217. This resolution did not however change the Charter scheme218 and 
seeing the irregular circumstances surrounding it (the resolution was passed in connection 
with the Korean crisis in an attempt from the UNGA to overcome the problems of vetoes 
in the UNSC when there was a need for action) which gave it an ad hoc nature, it has been 
seen as and dispossessed of any character as a legal precedent219. 
 
The Security Council 
 
At the outset, it must be noted, and always kept in mind when considering the measures 
taken by the UNSC, that it constitutes a highly political body. It is therefore very hazardous 
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EU is the largest provider of humanitarian aid in the world, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_03/aid.pdf visited on 2 November 2003. 
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Refugees and Others in Conflict Situations, para 16. 
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of State Autonomy”, 336 Columbia. Journal of Transnational Law (1997), p.482. 
to make both assumptions like the ones drawn from the jurisprudence of a court220, and 
conclusions concerning prevailing opinio juris from the UNSC’s practice. Of course, this is 
not to say that the Council’s actions must not be considered in a study such as the present; 
its weight on the international arena entails the very contrary. 
 
According to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC is invested with 
the power to deploy the use of force. This is the only manner in which the UN can diverge 
from the basic stipulations in Art 2(4) and Art 2(7) of the Charter not to intervene in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Member States. The measures of force at 
the disposal of the UNSC are found in Art 41 and Art 42 of the Charter according to which 
the Council first is to consider using measures not including armed force and then, should it 
conclude that such measures would or have proved to be inadequate, turn to the alternative 
of military action. Through Art 25 of the Charter, the Member States agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the UNSC in accordance with the Charter. The imposing of 
sanctions on a Member State by the Council thus means that all other Member States will 
restrict their trade with the target State accordingly. When armed force is deployed, the 
UNSC may, as was the case in e.g the Gulf War221 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina222, authorize 
Member States or regional organizations (Chapter VIII of the Charter) to pursue its goals of 
restoring international peace and security. The Council has hardly any other practical 
alternative to authorization in order to execute its decisions on the use of armed force since 
no agreements exist under Art 43 of the Charter constituting an international force under the 
direct auspices of the Council223. Still, it has been argued that UNSC measures taken through 
authorization of Member States have helped blur the line between actions taken by 
individual States and actions by the international community224. This might be true in the 
sense that certain States may find themselves with an additional legal argument for an 
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224 Chesterman, op.cit., Chapter 5. 
envisaged unilateral military action (see below under Implied UNSC authorization). It 
remains, nevertheless, that the action as such is still decided upon by the Council and that 
there is also a general acceptance from the international community of the Council’s 
authorization procedure for deploying armed force225. A modality of UNSC authorization, 
although not necessarily legal, is when countries take such unilateral measures in the absence 
of a Council mandate, but their actions are subsequently approved by the UNSC. That was 
the case when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent what it 
called a peacekeeping force to Liberia in the summer of 1990226 and when it intervened in 
Sierra Leone. 
 
The UNSC may not use its Chapter VII-powers arbitrarily. It is bound by Art 39 of the 
Charter according to which a pre-requisite of these powers is that a “threat to international 
peace and security” can be established. According to a pragmatic view it might be argued 
that the UNSC is solely competent to determine what is a “threat to international peace” and 
not. According to such a definition, a threat to international peace is whatever the UNSC 
determines falls under that definition. However, the Council remains a body formed and 
functioning under the UN Charter which according to its Art 24(2) binds the UNSC to act 
in accordance with it; the Council is thus “not unfettered in how it behaves and is not legally 
competent to declare that black is red”227.  
 
Although the solving of problems of a humanitarian character indeed is one of the purposes 
of the UN228, that goal is to be achieved through “international cooperation” and is not 
mentioned under Art 1(1) which envisages “effective collective measures” to achieve 
international peace. Therefore, while it is well known that the concept of what is a threat to 
international peace and security has been given a broad interpretation, it is noteworthy that 
such a threat is still a condition and that the Charter does not explicitly allow the UNSC to 
have recourse to force for the sole purpose of implementing humanitarian aid in non-
international situations. Some might argue that impediment of humanitarian assistance in 
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nearly all cases would constitute a threat to international peace and security since individual 
States and coalitions have shown that they will not hesitate to enforce aid unilaterally lacking 
UNSC action on the matter. The legality of such unilateral actions is however, to say the 
least, uncertain which is why it would not be advisable for the Council to subscribe to such 
an argument of realpolitik. This is not to say, of course, that impeding humanitarian assistance 
in internal armed conflicts could not be one of the constituents of a threat to international 
peace and security. This may for example be the case when aid is being hindered as a part of 
the perpetration of genocide229. 
 
Notwithstanding any illegality of a State’s refusal of humanitarian assistance under Art 18 
APII, the discussion above thus brings into question if the UNSC is invested with the power 
to undertake an enforcement action with the sole purpose of distributing humanitarian aid in 
internal armed conflicts. A similar debate was ignited when the UNSC directed sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977230. Doubt was raised if the 
Council was acting ultra vires the Charter when imposing sanctions in response to Ian Smith’s 
rebellion and the apartheid regime, which were both situations of a kind not explicitly 
mentioned in the Charter231. The very brief resume below of the UNSC’s actions to enforce 
humanitarian aid shows that the Council will not be affected by such concerns when taking 
humanitarian enforcement measures. 
 
Freed as it was of the strings of superpower tension after the end of the Cold War, the 
Council has had a renaissance during the 1990’s232. The stipulation of Art 39 of the Charter 
that a threat against international peace and security must be at hand has not encumbered 
UNSC action under Chapter VII in the absence of consent from the affected State or de facto 
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authority in order to provide humanitarian aid in non-international armed conflicts. In fact, it 
has done so on several occasions, for example in Somalia, East Timor and Bosnia-
Herzegovina233. In these cases, humanitarian aid was allowed to be enforced by “all necessary 
means”, including the use of force. The Council has also restrained itself to the imposition 
of sanctions, as in Kosovo234. In the cases of Somalia and East Timor, the UNSC stated in 
the relevant resolutions that a threat to international peace and security was at hand, whereas 
this is left out in the resolution 761 for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerning the latter, it merely 
expanded the mandate of the already existing UNPROFOR. In the Somalia resolution (794), 
the UNSC determined that “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security”. In many 
resolutions enforcing humanitarian aid one way or the other in internal armed conflicts, the 
UNSC has affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected State235. Also 
acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC has considered the impediment of humanitarian 
assistance a serious violation of international humanitarian law236, and it has condemned it237. 
 
The UNSC has thus been expansive in its interpretation of Art 39 of the Charter in order to 
respond to situations of urgent human suffering238; it has in fact acted to enforce the delivery 
of humanitarian aid in internal armed conflicts. Notwithstanding the fact that this is not 
provided for explicitly by the Charter, the goal of distributing humanitarian assistance is still 
as such certainly in line with a bona fide interpretation of the Charter. The Council would 
therefore hardly be declaring that ‘black is red’ when enforcing humanitarian assistance in 
internal armed conflicts. Furthermore, as any treaty the UN Charter may be changed 
pursuant to the practice of its parties according to Art 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
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S/RES/940 of 31 July 1994. 
the Law of Treaties239. At any rate, it must be noted that there is no review mechanism for 
the actions of the Council240, in light of which the ICJ has found that the organs of the UN 
are competent to determine in the first place their own jurisdiction241. Pragmatically, the 
answer to the question posed above if the UNSC is invested with the power to enforce 
humanitarian assistance in internal armed conflicts must thus be in the affirmative. 
 
However, the problem perceived by the present study is not so much whether the UNSC can 
enforce humanitarian aid but rather if the Council is well suited to do so. Several observations 
will be made with respect to this within the framework of a discussion on the advisability of 
the UN as an enforcement agent of humanitarian assistance. 
 
Advisability on the UN as enforcement agent 
 
A discussion on the advisability of the UN as an enforcer of the implementation of 
humanitarian aid is naturally ambivalent. On the one hand, it might be argued that the 
institution lacks the flexibility and rapidity to respond to humanitarian crisis in a satisfactory 
manner. Furthermore, the inherent political nature of all decisions emanating from the 
UNSC, menaces almost per se the principle of neutrality that applies to all humanitarian 
assistance242. The Council’s decisions ultimately rely on its Members’ considerations of their 
own national interests (such as economic interests or motivation to send their nationals into 
combat) and result in a randomness of action taken by the UNSC. The Council has for 
example chosen not to take measures to ensure a safe environment for humanitarian aid in 
Rwanda, where nothing was done to stop the slaughter in the spring of 1994 or in the 
conflict in Congo/Zaire where rebels attacked humanitarian aid workers and shipments243. 
Nor did the UNSC authorize any action to implement the delivery of humanitarian aid in 
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Kosovo in 1999. This instability and lack of predictability of the Council’s decisions hamper 
the principle that humanitarian aid should only be distributed on the sole basis of need. 
Moreover, the absence of a review mechanism as well as the secrecy which shades many of 
the UNSC’s ‘informal’ meetings put in question whether the Council always promotes 
conflict resolution through dialogue and cooperation244. Indeed, seeing that the UNSC’s 
mandate include both ‘legislative’, ‘prosecuting’ and ‘executive’ functions, the institution 
does has a inquisitorial scent to it. On the other hand, it must be concluded that the UN is in 
fact the only international organ which, more or less within the scope of the rules applicable 
to it and at least without condemnation from the international community, can implement a 
potential right to humanitarian assistance according to international humanitarian law (as to 
such a right, see Chapter III). Other organizations may indeed have more resources to do so, 
but their actions would not enjoy the legitimacy from which benefits the UN. Any decision 
by the international community to use force should be taken within the framework of a 
common institution with the aim of achieving peace. Furthermore, it would be advisable 
that, when armed, also the enforcement action as such is under UN command following 
agreements under Art 43 of the Charter. UNSC authorization for States to undertake the 
implementation of humanitarian aid has already been exploited by certain States eager to use 
military force, (see below under ‘Implied UNSC authorization’) 
 
The constitution of the UN is a revolutionary step in the course of history and an extra-
ordinary accomplishment inasmuch as States have actually subjected their use of force to a 
peaceful forum. It is of course true that the lack of transparency and the veto rights of the 
UNSC are among the built-in defects of this forum that need to be remedied. In order for 
the UN not to undermine its legitimacy and rigidity by resorting to uncertain or large 
interpretations of well-intended rules, nor to be paralyzed by outdated provisions, the 
Organization and particularly its Council seems to be in dire need of a reformation. Such a 
reformation is thus motivated by a desire to strengthen the UN system and based on the 
belief that there exists an essential link between the legitimacy and the operational efficiency 
of that system. As to the task of enforcing humanitarian assistance, very clear rules on the 
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conditions in which the assistance could be enforced as well and the powers and manners to 
do so would have to be among the changes to be carried out. In relation to this, special care 
should be taken to eliminate Member State’s possibilities to advance their own political goals 
under the auspices of humanitarian aid. For the legality of forcible implementation of 
humanitarian aid unleashes an immense power in that it includes the use of force and in that 
it overruns State sovereignty. It would be naïve and dangerous to expect that States would 
use such a power altruistically on their own initiative and not abuse it for their own interests; 
the human history of war as well as the present provide too many examples to the 
contrary245.  
 
States or regional organizations 
 
Absence of UNSC response to humanitarian crises has on several occasions ignited a debate 
on the lawfulness of uni- or multilateral measures of States presumably undertaken to 
compensate such inaction by the Council. This has often been labeled humanitarian 
intervention, a general discussion on which has been conducted above. 
 
In their endeavors to find legal grounds for unilateral humanitarian intervention, States have 
invoked numerous moral and legal arguments. Many of these would seem to be relevant also 
for the purposes of the legality of unilateral enforcement of humanitarian assistance by one 
or several States; the implementation of humanitarian aid may very well form part of a 
humanitarian intervention. In fact, many of the armed unilateral interventions carried out 
under humanitarian flag have been initiated by the securing of access for and delivery of 
humanitarian aid. Moral arguments of humanitarian considerations are often used as 
justification for humanitarian intervention. Some of the more specifically legal justifications 
                                                 
245 For a view opposing the Hobbesian model of history as a war of all against all, see e.g. Anthony D’Amato, 
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of this kind of intervention will be briefly discussed in this section, namely the ones of 
‘implied authorization’ and ‘material breach’. 
 
According to established international law, States acting alone or in concert do only have the 
interim right to unilaterally resort to armed force in an act of self-defense under Art 51 of 
the UN Charter, until the UNSC can be seized of the matter. In all other cases, they are 
bound by the peremptory norm stipulated in Art 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter. Art 53 of the 
Charter makes clear that also regional organizations need to acquire UNSC authorization 
before embarking on enforcement actions246. Although it is true that Art 1 common to the 
GCs does call upon States to respect and make respect the rules of international 
humanitarian law, this provision does not constitute an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force. It must equally be noted that the complex of rules applicable within the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) extensively restricts member States’ possibility to unilaterally 
impose economic sanctions upon other members of that organization, as do the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility247. That Draft is 
based on reciprocity (as opposed to the GC complex) apart from Art 40 which refers to 
peremptory norms of international law – jus cogens; a threshold to which the denial to accept 
humanitarian aid may amount when undertaken as part of the perpetration of a serious 
international crime, e.g. genocide, but more doubtfully when being unlawful as the result of a 
relatively broad interpretation of Art 18 APII. 
 
As has been said, the power balance of the Cold War indeed restrained the actions of the 
UNSC during the first forty-five years of the latter’s existence; however, perestrojka, glasnost, 
the abandon of the Brezhnev doctrine in May 1989 and subsequent events equally unleashed 
the one remaining superpower from the fetters of ‘equal superpower force’. In the last 
decade of the second millennium the world thus found itself with one State sufficiently 
strong to endure any military, political or economic impacts as consequences of its own 
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wrongdoing. The vast array of practical implications of this fact must be borne in mind 
when considering States as enforcement agents of humanitarian assistance. 
 
‘Implied UNSC authorization’ and ‘Material breach’ 
 
There are numerous cases where the UNSC has authorized Member States to take action on 
its behalf, and certain authors have even gone so far as to assert that the original scheme of 
Chapter VII of the Charter is not workable and that it should no longer be for the UN itself 
to conduct enforcement actions248. These should instead be for Member States to 
undertake249. As mentioned above under the discussion on the UNSC, however, the 
underlying decision on the use of force still remains with the Council which most often 
emphasizes in its relevant resolutions that it “remains seized of the matter”. This indicates 
that the decision on any further action remains with the Council. 
 
In some cases, countries – the USA and the UK in particular – have advocated a right to 
intervene in ways otherwise prohibited by the UN Charter stemming from anterior UNSC 
resolutions. This trend of ‘implied UNSC authorization’ began with an enforcement action 
of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Kurds,  who were subject to Iraqi attacks in 
February 1991. In its resolution 688, the UNSC found that the attacks constituted a threat to 
peace and security in the region and called on Iraq to end its repression of the Kurds and to 
allow for humanitarian assistance to reach northern Iraq250. Protective no-fly zones were 
then established by three members of the Coalition who were also members of the UNSC, 
(the action went under the name ‘Operation Provide Comfort’), the creation of which went 
well beyond distributing humanitarian aid. The UK has argued that the resolution 688, read 
together with resolution 678 (authorizing the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and all 
                                                 
248 See Christine Gray, ”From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Forceagainst Iraq”, in 
European Journal of International Law (2002), vol.13, no.1, p.3 and note 5. She points out (p.4) that the cases after 
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necessary means to bring peace to the region) provided sufficient authority to create the 
zones as part of the response to Iraq’s violation of international peace251.  
 
Concerning the resolutions 688 and 678 as a basis for the unilateral intervention the 
‘Operation Provide Comfort’ constituted, the following may be said. Resolution 678 was 
specifically tailored for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait; in any case the issues entailing 
‘Operation Provide Comfort’ was not at hand yet which is why the resolution could not have 
been aimed at them. As to resolution 688, which did envisage the Iraqi repression of the 
Kurdish population in the northern part of the country, it was not passed under Chapter 
VII, nor did it make any reference to earlier UNSC resolutions on Iraq. Instead, the 
resolution in its preamble252 made reference to Art 2(7) of the UN Charter, which affirms the 
sovereignty of all Member States. 
 
Even though Iraq subsequently might have given its consent to the zone, the establishment 
of the latter serves as a very good example, in addition to e.g. those of Somalia and Kosovo, 
of how the enforcement of humanitarian aid inherently will entail many additional measures 
other than purely the aid as such if it is going to be actually implemented in the absence of 
the affected State’s consent. These measures will necessarily interfere with the sovereignty of 
the affected State. Such interference may prove to be rather extensive in time, and will not 
necessarily be temporarily limited to the enforcement action253. In the case of the no-fly 
zones this is highlighted through the 2001 air strikes against Iraq carried out by the USA and 
the UK in response to an increase in surface-to-air missiles attacks on coalition pilots in the 
zone during January 2001254. These are of course only some of the links in the chain of 
Western interference in Iraq.  
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 In December 1998, the USA and UK undertook ‘Operation Desert Fox’, which included 
four days and nights of missile attacks against Iraq, when the country denied co-operation 
with the UN weapons inspectors. In so doing Iraq did not, however, use any armed force. 
Along with the argument of ‘implied UNSC authorization’, the USA and the UK invoked 
that the withdrawal of co-operation was a breach of Iraq to the ceasefire regime established 
by resolution 687255 as well as subsequent resolutions on weapons inspections which made it 
a condition of the ceasefire that Iraq destroy its weapons of mass destruction256. This flagrant 
violation of UNSC resolutions was a ‘material breach’ which justified intervention. Such an 
argument was also among the many more or less well defined legal grounds for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Somewhat surprisingly, the doctrine of ‘material breach’ has on one 
occasion been endorsed by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG). When 
commenting on the USA and UK January 1993 operation against Iraqi missile sites in the 
no-fly zones, he argued that the action was mandated by the UNSC according to its 
resolution 678, and the cause was the violation by Iraq of the ceasefire resolution257. This 
argument has not been repeated by the UNSG258, and it has been criticized because it 
overlooks the fundamental fact that according to the Charter the decision on the use of 
force lies with the UNSC. 
 
Advisability on States or regional organizations as enforcement agents 
 
The notions of ‘implied UNSC authorization’ and ‘material breach’ naturally vastly enlarge 
States’ possibilities to use armed force. It must be noted that, still without any global 
consensus on the legality of these justifications of the use of force, they have had some 
factual impact in that they have been used as grounds for intervention. The unilateral use of 
force to enforce humanitarian aid (at least on the surface of it) also shows, notwithstanding 
any rules of international law, a will within the international community to react to cases 
where assistance is being impeded. The problem is that the undertakings to realize such a 
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will have been fairly concentrated to a small number of States and that humanitarian 
concerns may not be their only motivation for using armed force259. The aid will thus not 
always be distributed to those in most dire need of it. Most importantly, however, unilateral 
acts of this kind undermine the authority of the UN system and the international legal order, 
in particular when they are undertaken by the most powerful player on the international 
arena. That is catalyzed when attempts are being made to fit the violation of international 
law constituted by such unilateral acts into the existing framework of international law; then 
what is being done might be “to mould that law to accommodate the shifting practices of 
the powerful”260. 
 
In the case of Iraq the military intervention was clearly of an escalating nature. The reasons 
for such escalation might be due to the fact that the durable solving of humanitarian 
problems is never a ‘punctual’ effort, but often profound changes must be done if suffering 
is to be eliminated on a sustainable basis261. However, other reasons may also consist of long 
and short term strategic and economical concerns of the enforcing States taking use of the 
humanitarian disaster to achieve such goals. Even acknowledging the existence of altruistic 
States – a conception contradicted by both classical and contemporary history as well as 
recent events – it would seem an overwhelming task for one or a small number of States to 
neutrally be able to consider all the practical, political, ideological, cultural and other national 
and international implications of an intervention enterprise. Unless, of course, such 
problems are not realized by the States intervening unilaterally because they are compelled in 
their actions by a conviction of their own supremacy in such matters and therefore envisage 
themselves as rendering other nations (embracing other lifestyles, strange to the intervening 
States), a service. In order to strip good intentions of such potential single-mindedness262, an 
organization comprised of the vast majority of the international community would instead 
seem much more suited for the task of enforcing humanitarian assistance. The military or 
                                                 
259 Farer, op.cit., p.75 alleges that the USA have ”wrapped particularistic interests of an economic or geo-
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260 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, op.cit., 203 
261 It has been argued above under Humanitarian intervention that the coalition’s actions in violation of Iraq’s 
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262 History offers many examples of what Farer, op.cit., p.76 calls ”civilizing missions and morally educative 
vocations”. Religious missonaries in Africa or forcible Western education of samis, inuits and other indigenous 
peoples may be mentioned as two examples. 
economic coalitions of today (NATO, EU, OSCE, African Union, ASEAN, etc.) do not 
amount to the vast political, ideological and cultural diversity required by such an 
organization. 
 
The enforcement of humanitarian assistance by definition does not aspire beyond the pure 
alleviation of urgent human suffering. But, as mentioned, it may very well form part of a 
larger intervening enterprise and, if considered legal, also legally justify such an enterprise. 
Seeing that the enforcement of humanitarian aid includes the use of force if necessary and 
that single States or today’s coalitions, for the reasons above, are not well suited for neither 
the task of deciding when enforcement action should be taken, nor be commanding the 
undertaking, they are not judged competent as enforcing agents of humanitarian aid. 
 
Alternative procedure for enforcement decision-making 
 
A few general conclusions can be drawn from the discussions above on the UN, States and 
regional organizations as enforcement agents for humanitarian assistance. Firstly, 
notwithstanding what organ is responsible for an enforcement action, clear rules on under 
what circumstances humanitarian aid can be forcibly implemented and by what means must 
be elaborated in addition to existing humanitarian law. Secondly, these rules should be 
applied by an international peaceful organization stripped of political considerations and 
representing a diverse majority of the international community, which diligently could make 
neutral assessments of where humanitarian assistance is being unlawfully refused. Finally, 
such an organization would have to be able to react quickly to imminent humanitarian crises. 
With respect to this, in situations where such response necessitates the use of armed force, it 
would be desirable to have the troops under the command of the international organization. 
 
When elaborating on any suggestions in relation to the issues above it must always be 
appreciated that the UN, the ICRC, other inter-governmental organizations and NGOs, 
especially local ones, do a huge work essential in different humanitarian crisis worldwide. 
Their experience and detailed knowledge must evidently be carefully appraised before 
deciding on any kind of measure to enforce humanitarian assistance or any assessment 
forming the base for such measures. 
 
The International Institute of Humanitarian Law has elaborated 14 Guiding Principles on 
the Right to Humanitarian Assistance. This document stipulates in which circumstances such 
a right could be invoked (Principle 3), that humanitarian assistance must be granted access 
(Principle 6 and 10) and that the aid may be enforced by “all necessary means” failing 
granted access (Principle 6). The Principles also establish some fundamental criteria 
concerning character of a forceful implementation enterprise, e.g. that it should be set off by 
the UNSC. It is suggested that these Principles form a platform for international declarations 
and/or treaties to the effect of achieving the desired clarity of the rules applicable to 
humanitarian assistance, especially as to when and by whom it could be enforced. 
 
An international peaceful organization with considerably less political occupations than – 
and formally not a part of – the UN is the International Criminal Court. This court 
represents a broad cultural diversity through the vast array of State Parties to the Rome 
Statute263. As has been described in this study, the hindrance of humanitarian assistance can 
form part of several international crimes under the Rome Statute. The rules of the Rome 
Statute are relatively clear and inasmuch as they are not, they may be clarified through the 
jurisprudence of the ICC264. Although international courts are more directly subject to 
politics than national ones, the ICC’s interpretation of the Rome Statute would still be of a 
legal nature and thus profit from predictability and certitude, as opposed to the moody 
practice of the UNSC. It is true that the ICC to date lacks resources, but the court has only 
started its work, and it will evolve as different questions are referred to it. In order to be able 
to have a speedy process, a possibility for the ICC to give advisory opinions would seem 
reasonable265. 
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264 According to Art 21of the Rome Statute, the ICC shall in the first place apply the rules of the Rome Statute, 
but have, in second place recourse also to inter alia applicable treaties and principles and rules of international 
law, and failing that even general principles derived from national laws.  
265 The Rome Statute does not contain any provisions on advisory opinions. 
The ICC thus fulfills all of the criteria suggested above for an international organ responsible 
for decisions to enforce humanitarian aid except for the one on quick response. The latter 
would also be failing the ICJ if this court was given a similar responsibility. The ICJ is 
furthermore not specialized in humanitarian law as opposed to the ICC, and it is a part of 
the UN. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the ICJ is subject to the consent of the litigating States 
according to Art 38(5) of its Rules, whereas Art 12 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC 
jurisdiction over alleged crimes referred to it under Art 14, Art 13(b) or Art 13(c) of the 
Rome Statute committed within the territory of a State Party or by an alleged perpetrator 
who is the national of such a State. Admittedly, the ICC’s jurisdiction is complimentary to 
that of national courts according to paragraph 10 of the Preamble, Art 1 and Art 17 of the 
Rome Statute but the latter article provides safe-guards to ensure a bona fide application of 
the Statute on the national level as well as to uphold the rules of the Statute when the 
relevant State is unable to apply them (Art 17(1)(a)). It is also noteworthy that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is not subject to UNSC approval266. In cases where humanitarian 
assistance is being unlawfully impeded by an insurgent party the affected State would thus 
have recourse to the ICC if it could not pursue the perpetrators itself and in cases where the 
illegal refusal is made on behalf of the State the latter would hardly persecute itself, thus 
activating the subsidiary jurisdiction of the ICC.  
 
The present argumentation does not suggest that the ICC should be invested with the power 
to deploy military force in order to enforce humanitarian assistance. It would be unrealistic 
to expect broad international approval of such a drastic motion267. What is proposed de lege 
ferenda is instead that the described qualities (contrasted to the defects of the UNSC) of the 
ICC should be taken into account when undertaking a most needed revision of the rules 
applicable to the UNSC. This would be done to the effect that the ICC – collaborating with 
humanitarian organizations in fact-finding – be given a significant advisory role with respect 
to any determination on the unlawfulness of impediment of humanitarian assistance in 
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for a period of 12 months in a resolution taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; a procedure that may be 
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267 Seeing that the world’s only superpower is actively working against the ICC, it could be argued that any 
suggestion involving that court is unrealistic. Although this essay aims at practical solutions to practical 
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require some efforts to be undertaken in order to achive practical, durable, solutions. 
internal conflicts. For example, the Council’s exercise of a potential express stipulation in the 
UN Charter giving the former a power to combat humanitarian disasters with force could be 
subject to obtaining an advisory opinion on the situation at hand by the ICC. This Court 
would evaluate whether humanitarian aid is being unlawfully refused in the relevant 
situation. The invaluable ground knowledge of the humanitarian actors mentioned above 
would then be duly legally assessed by a competent organ, forming a sound, sustainable and 
legal basis (cleansed of political ambitions) for decisions on eventual measures persuading 
States to accept humanitarian aid. Keeping in close and constant contact (without loosing 
their individual autonomy) and enjoying mutual confidence, these organs – the humanitarian 
actors, the ICC and the UNSC – would enable rapid reactions to unlawful refusals of 
humanitarian aid when they occur. Measures subsequently undertaken by the UNSC to this 
end would thus to a greater extent “reflect the objectives of the international community 
[and] not just the national interests of its most powerful members”268. The occurrence of 
these measures taken on the suggested legal basis would equally profit from an increased 
predictability. It must be underlined that it is not advisable that the ICC also give advice on 
matters outside the pure question of legality of a refusal as such. Excluded are thus any 
opinions as to whether an enforcement action should be undertaken and, in the affirmative, 
by what means; according to international law these responsibilities still rest upon the 
UNSC. As argued above, however, their application and scope might have to be defined, but 
they should as such remain with the Council which would thus not have its mandate 
diminished. Quite oppositely, it may prove that the proposed advisory role of the ICC would 
contribute to the strengthening of the UN system as a whole since its assessments will 
enhance the legitimacy and legality of Council actions to enforce humanitarian aid. 
 
It is true that the ICC has jurisdiction over deeds of individuals and not over those of States. 
However, States are run by individuals, a fact that the UNSC has taken into consideration in 
establishing the ICTY and the ICTR. According to Art 27 of the Rome Statute, not even 
Heads of State can escape the ICC’s jurisdiction by reference to their official capacity. 
Furthermore, as argued above in Chapter III, the rules of humanitarian law might, in certain 
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situations of which some would have to be more elaborately defined e.g. Art 18 APII, impose 
a negative obligation upon belligerents to accept humanitarian assistance. Seeing that the ICJ 
does not have personal jurisdiction, this is also an argument additional to those of lack of 
independence and weak jurisdiction on behalf of that court which render the ICC a stronger 
candidate for the suggested advisory role. 
 
In response to the above proposal the objection might be made that it in fact is contrary to 
the rationale of State sovereignty that has been put forth throughout this essay. What has 
been argued with respect to State sovereignty, however, is that it is a legitimate basis for 
international relations because it prevents war in a long term perspective. Intrusions on it on 
humanitarian grounds must be clearly defined and regulated lest they will be misused, thus 
risking war269. Suggesting that an advisory opinion of the ICC – a forum to which sovereign 
States voluntarily have adhered – could constitute a solid ground for a judgment on the use 
of force to implement humanitarian assistance would strengthen the rationale behind State 
sovereignty since this would bring rigidity and stringency into the equation. It would thus 
diminish the possibilities for power-greedy States to profit from an uncertain state of law. 
The mere circumstance that the ICC be given the proposed function does not as such 
menace sovereign rights compared to how they are subjected to international organizations 
today. In its practice, however, the court may find that State sovereignty is inferior to the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance in internal armed conflicts. For instance, this could come 
about through a broad interpretation of “attacks against humanitarian assistance” in Art 
8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute or by using Art 21(1)(b) or (c) of the Statute to take into 
consideration the ICRC interpretation of Art 18 APII or even the Guiding Principles 
mentioned above, should they evolve into declarations and/or treaties as suggested. Then, 
sovereign rights would more definitely be subjected to humanitarian assistance than they are 
today. But it is not as important if the provision of aid would prevail over State sovereignty, 
as it is how this hierarchy would come about, because the dangers to international peace lay in 
the latter paradigm270. Those threats would be reduced if State sovereignty was to yield 
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Statute, so that it does not experience problems similar to those described above concerning the UNSC acting 
ultra vires the UN Charter, or, even worse, indulge in such vast interpretation of the rules applicable to it as the 
European Court Justice has done, detrimental to its legitimacy. 
following a clear and legal process as opposed to ad hoc solutions and/or purely moral 
arguments. 
 
Chapter IV – Means of enforcement 
 
Whereas the preceding Chapter discussed the legality and legitimacy of any decision to 
enforce humanitarian assistance, the present one will be concerned with the same aspects of 
the methods chosen by the enforcing agents to implement such a decision. Although 
comparing the advisability of different means of enforcement irrespective of the specific 
details of the armed conflict were they are being deployed might be somewhat hazardous, 
this Chapter will still so bold as to elaborate on the general advisability of different means of 
enforcement of humanitarian aid by examination of their use in some summarily described 
situations. 
 
In the sanctions section, primarily sanctions imposed by the UNSC will be discussed, since 
they are the ones that will have the greatest effect on the targeted State. Admittedly, smaller 
States may well be at the economic mercy of a large economy such as the EU or the USA, 
but since inter-State sanctions are subject to comparatively clear rules outside the immediate 
realm of humanitarian law, such as State Responsibility/countermeasures law and the WTO, 
no particular attention will be paid to them. 
 
There have been cases where pacific means have sufficed to compel or trick the concerned 
State to allow for the humanitarian aid to be delivered. In Somalia, before it asked for 
military protection, the ICRC had in fact been able to set up a large-scale famine relief 
program in different communities thanks to complex negotiations with local authorities and 
without any outside military protection; and during the civil war in Afghanistan, market 
mechanisms, private transport and unmarked food bags were used to get the aid out to the 
needy271. When present, national NGOs are of course an important factor and they are of 
valuable assistance in implementing the aid. In the Introductory remarks to Part Two, it was 
noted that in situations where non-compliance with an international rule is desired by a 
State, it will decide whether to comply or not after having evaluated the costs of non-
compliance; the State will conduct an assessment of the debit and credit of its political, 
economical and military international ‘balance sheet’. There are many possible ways to 
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increase those costs and thus to compel a refusing authority to accept relief actions – 
including political, diplomatic and media pressure – which are only limited by the minds of 
clever and experienced negotiators with an understanding of the reasons for the denial and 
the material conflict. These people would evidently also be alert to any potential unwanted 
effects of their solutions, for example subjecting humanitarian aid to criminal elements of a 
black market, from which an incumbent regime very well might profit. Seeing that 
implementation ultimately may entail aggressive methods, i.e. sanctions or armed force, and 
that these are the ones interfering with sovereign rights272, they will be the chief subject of 
the following examination. 
 
As a general remark, especially in light of the fact that refusal of humanitarian aid, according 
to one interpretation of Art 18 APII, is subject to conditions of proportionality, it would 
seem reasonable to assert that actions enforcing assistance are subject to equal requirements. 
 
United Nations sanctions 
 
When it finds that those sanctions are designed and implemented to systematically affect vulnerable 
groups, that their impact is so severe that ever-wider sections of the population sink into poverty, that 
humanitarian aid is totally inadequate and humanitarian agencies are denied the means to operate, 
then there is a need to ask the Security Council: Where is the balance between politics and 
humanitarianism?273 
 
The UNSC used its powers under Art 41 of the UN Charter for the first time in 1966 when 
it imposed sanctions on Rhodesia274. That was only repeated once before the end of the Cold 
War with the sanctions against South Africa in 1977275. With the 1990’s came a tremendous 
increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument for the UNSC to attain its goals276; after the 
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(Conclusion) Thomas Weiss, ed., Oxford, 1997, p.231-232. 
274 S/RES/232 of 16 December 1966 
275 S/RES/418 of 4 November 1977 
276 Sanctions have been directed against Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, FRY, Haiti, Somalia, Angola, 
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Cold War, the Council imposed nine sanctions regimes in only four years277. Especially after 
reports from NGOs on the terrible conditions in Haiti and Iraq and that these may indeed 
be due to the comprehensive mandatory trade sanctions imposed on those countries278, the 
debate shifted from having been occupied with the effectiveness of sanctions in the 
beginning of the decade, to being more concerned with their humanitarian impacts279. 
 
Voices have also been raised that sanctions regimes have had devastating effects on the 
economies of third States. Art 50 of the UN Charter provides for a “right to consult with the 
Security Council with regard to a solution of” special economic problems confronting third 
States as a result of UNSC imposed sanctions. Following the sanctions directed against Iraq 
in response to its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, 21 governments called for help under 
that article, claiming a total estimated loss of USD 30 billion280. A collective complaint made 
by theses States in March 1991 merely resulted in a UNSC appeal to governments and 
international institutions for help which led to some economic compensation (e.g. in the 
form of debt relief, concessional loans or grants) but not to all the affected countries281. 
 
Comprehensive versus targeted sanctions 
 
Comprehensive sanctions could be described as a carpet-bombing of the economy of the 
affected State, as opposed to targeted (or ‘smart’) sanctions which merely aim at specific 
sectors of the economy, such as arms, diamonds or travel. For example, in its resolution 661 
the UNSC decided that: 
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States” in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, ed., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Oxford, 
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281 Ibid. p.189; India and Vietnam for example, received nothing. 
all States shall prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating 
from Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of the present resolution;…282  
 
Looking at statistics, comprehensive sanctions seem to be more susceptible to attain their 
goal of compelling the pursued State to act in a certain way than targeted ones. Out of the 
three comprehensive sanctions regimes imposed between 1990 and 2001 – Iraq, FRY and 
Haiti283 – the ones directed against Iraq and the FRY were partially effective, whereas only 
two out of the ten cases with more limited sanctions had partial impact284, namely the ones 
against Libya and Cambodia285. Investigating the circumstances surrounding these sanctions 
regimes, however, their success is revealed as being more a consequence of vigorous 
enforcement of and broad international compliance with the sanctions than corollary to their 
comprehensive or ‘smart’ character286. In the case of the FRY, the USA and other major 
powers strongly enforced the sanctions, for example by establishing Sanctions Assistance 
Missions in neighboring States and in the case of Cambodia the diplomatic and political 
isolation of the Khmer Rouge was virtually complete. Oppositely, in Haiti the sanctions were 
lifted and then reapplied and in Sierra Leone the effectiveness of the sanctions was 
undermined by lax enforcement, especially in neighboring Liberia287. The efficiency of a 
sanctions regime would thus be depending on the implementation of it, notwithstanding 
whether the sanctions enforced are comprehensive or targeted. 
 
Turning now from the efficiency of comprehensive sanctions to their humanitarian 
consequences288, the former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Graf Sponeck has 
brought forth that Iraq, previously a socio-economically progressing country, has become 
increasingly impoverished and, in economic and social terms, a poorly performing State 
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288 Craven op.cit., p.60, points out that ”a concern as to the effect of sanctions is construed less as an argument 
against sanctions as a practice, and more as an argument as to how sanctions can be improved as a strategic 
tool”. 
since 1990289. Sponeck has also concluded that “[i]t is a fact that the comprehensive 
economic sanctions are contributing to civilian suffering” and that the humanitarian 
exemptions290 that were made to them did not adequately protect the Iraqi population291. 
Exemptions to the comprehensive sanctions regime against Iraq for humanitarian deliveries 
were further complicated by the Goods Review List292 (GRL) which pointed out goods with 
so called ‘dual use’ meaning that they could be used e.g. both for medical and military 
purposes and were therefore subject to control and restrictions. Various UN agencies have 
estimated that comprehensive sanctions have contributed to the death of hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqi civilians293. The United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) global 
review of child health 2001 showed an increase in child mortality of 160 per cent in the 
country which was the highest of all 188 countries examined for the 1990-1999 period294. 
The comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by resolution 661 (quoted above) against the 
country was finally – and not surprisingly – lifted following the U.S-led invasion of the 
country in March 2003295. Concerning the UN sanctions on Haiti it has been said that the 
wealthy elite and the military command were “waxing rich off the contraband industry the 
economic sanctions spawned. The rest of the population, which had been deprived of its 
popularly elected government and whom we were supposed to be helping, was, without 
exaggeration, starving to death”296. Although the military coup on the 29th of September 
1991 had triggered the Haitian crisis a report from Harvard University attributed to 
sanctions one thousand excess deaths per month among children under five years of age297. 
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Arguably, comprehensive sanctions are tailored for democratic, parliamentary States where 
the population has the possibility to exercise power and dismiss the incumbent leaders who 
are provoking action from the international community. That has rarely been the case in the 
countries against which sanctions have been directed. However, even in democratic States, 
the problem still remains that sanctions may “defeat their own purpose by provoking a 
patriotic response against the international community, symbolized by the United Nations, 
and by rallying the population behind the leaders whose behavior the sanctions are intended 
to modify”298. 
 
Thus, taking into account the recorded severe humanitarian impact of comprehensive 
sanctions, it would be counter-productive and heartbreaking to see them be applied as a 
means of pressuring an authority to accept humanitarian aid. To say the least, it is irrational 
and ruthless to punish the civilian victim population for the acts of its suppressor. Even 
presuming that the humanitarian exemptions allowed for by such a sanctions regime would 
be adequate for the basic needs of the civilian population, comprehensive sanctions would 
still keep the people on an existential minimum. These practical arguments alone render 
comprehensive sanctions highly inappropriate as a means of enforcement of humanitarian 
assistance. However, also purely juridical elements can be raised as to the advisability and 
even the legality of comprehensive sanctions for this purpose. A smaller excursion on this 
issue is therefore afforded. 
Legality of comprehensive sanctions 
 
An assessment of the legality of comprehensive sanctions must first consider whether the 
UNSC is bound by international law when upholding international peace and security; as 
have been noted, a proposal to that effect was actually rejected in San Francisco (see under 
Enforcement agents: The Security Council). The question here is not whether the Council 
has the power to impose sanctions as such – that has been discussed at length above – but 
rather if it has to respect humanitarian law in doing so. 
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The practice of the UNSC reflects that it considers itself bound by some humanitarian limits, 
this is shown e.g. by the exemption of humanitarian supplies from sanctions. It has also been 
argued that more than ten years of measures against Iraq has led to a consensus that the 
UNSC is bound by some legal standards in its application of Chapter VII and that this is 
sustained by its own actions299. With the introduction of ‘smart’ sanctions and humanitarian 
exemptions, the UNSC has indeed revealed a somewhat more humane side, but some have 
argued that it remains uncertain whether this is a “policy informed by legal principle or 
simply by a compliant pragmatism”300. The fact that the UN explicitly has acknowledged that 
it is restrained by general principles of humanitarian law when deploying armed force301 
would seem reasonable to apply analogously to the Council’s sanctions, seeing that armed 
force and sanctions are different means with similar goals, roots and consequences. 
 
Assuming that the UNSC perceives itself as bound by international law, there are different 
schools of thought on what law should apply to its sanctions regimes: human rights law, 
humanitarian law or perhaps the law on countermeasures. For the purposes of this essay, 
sanctions will be analyzed in the light of international humanitarian law. Such an approach is 
supported by the fact that Art 1, 2, 24(2) and 39 of the UN Charter constrain actions taken 
by the UNSC which thus fall within a predetermined legal framework, and many authors are 
of the opinion that the Council, when thus defending international peace “is subject to the 
same laws of war of humanitarian law that have been prescribed for others”302. It seems 
important to analyze the UNSC’s measures under specific rules of humanitarian law so as to 
avoid that the Council can clear its conscience merely satisfied that it is operating in 
accordance with humanitarian principles303. 
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The impeding of humanitarian assistance by States or other responsible authorities can very 
well contribute to the starvation of civilians. When applied as a method of warfare, this 
constitutes a breach of Art 14 APII or Art 54 API. With this in mind, turning to the UNSC, 
it is evidently incorrect to assume that only the military instrument of the Council is 
destructive. The fact that sanctions contribute to starvation of civilians have been made 
obvious through the examples and numbers above. With their historical roots in the 
blockades deployed as strategic measures of war and seeing that they are still used to inflict 
harm upon an opponent in order to make him act in a certain way sanctions can very well be 
seen as a method of warfare. That harm inflicted is of course the hardships a comprehensive 
sanctions regime entails for the affected country as a whole. 
 
Consider the following comparison between the impeding of humanitarian assistance (1) and 
the imposing of a comprehensive sanctions regime (2): 
 
1. The relevant State and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian 
organizations shall, through planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit 
the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the 
Muslim population, making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding 
condemnation by the international community and international public opinion304. 
 
2. [A]ll States shall prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products 
originating from Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of the present resolution;305 
 
Despite UNPROFOR efforts to distribute humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
humanitarian exemptions to the comprehensive sanctions regime against Iraq, both of the 
quoted provisions have contributed to a massive loss of civilian life and enormous 
sufferance of innocent people. Both also amount to the actus reus of genocide, which has 
been exemplified by the ICTR as subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet and 
reducing essential medical services below minimum requirement306, (see above under 
Genocide). Naturally, the two cases had different grounds. The first was a part of the 
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perpetration of a crime against humanity whereas the second one was aimed at upholding 
international law by putting an end to the military invasion of a sovereign State. A common 
feature between them, however, is their blatant disrespect for human life in their deployment 
of measures to compel another party.  
 
Another difference between the impeding of humanitarian assistance and UNSC 
comprehensive sanctions in general is that the former will not automatically constitute a 
method of warfare as the relief might be refused on grounds other than strategic ones, 
whereas the latter will constitute a method of warfare as sanctions are an alternative to the 
use of force as a means of persuasion according to the UN Charter. Comprehensive 
sanctions are thus in breach of Art 14 APII as they starve civilians as a method of warfare. 
 
As described above, the ICRC has promoted that Art 4(2)(b) APII which prohibits collective 
punishments should be understood in its widest sense and include any kind of sanction307. 
Collective punishments are perceived as “penalties of any kind inflicted on a group of 
persons in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity, for acts that these 
persons have not committed”308. Even though comprehensive sanctions are supposedly 
applied as a means of changing the behavior of a State and not for punishing purposes, they 
pursue their goal by indiscriminately inflicting harm upon individuals who are not in a 
position to bring about the sought changes. This punishing character of comprehensive 
sanctions does therefore by analogy render them in breach of Art 4(2)(b) APII on the 
prohibition of collective punishments. 
 
It would of course be difficult to prove any intent on behalf of the representatives of the 
Members of the UNSC with respect to the perpetration of an international crime by way of 
imposing comprehensive sanctions. However, in the light of the enormous civilian suffering 
that comprehensive sanctions will entail, it would seem relevant to focus on causation309. 
Higgins has argued that ‘collateral’ injury in respect of weapons has always been accepted as 
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not constituting intent, provided always that the requirements of proportionality are met310. 
The principle of proportionality also applies to the UNSC’s actions to debilitate threats to 
international peace and security which cannot be disproportionate to that goal311. Seeing that 
comprehensive sanctions punish persons primarily without the power to influence the 
pursued goal of the sanctions, they are clearly disproportionate – in some cases, e.g that of 
ten years of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, they are even beyond that, bordering 
recklessness. The question can thus be asked if intent on behalf of the people responsible for 
imposing comprehensive sanctions could not be inferred in some cases. This could certainly 
be the case if comprehensive sanctions were judged under the Rome Statute, Art 7(2)(b) of 
which concerns the crime against humanity of extermination, including inter alia the 
deprivation of food and medicine. As to the intent required for this crime, Art 30(2)(b) of 
the Rome Statute stipulates that it is sufficient that the person behind the crime was “aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”. It is very had to see how the diligent 
representatives of the Members of the UNSC could not be aware of the devastating 
consequences of sanctions for civilian populations in States which are subject to their 
comprehensive sanctions regimes, especially since those States are mostly third world 
countries. 
Targeted sanctions 
 
In order to minimize unwanted civilian suffering of sanctions, the 1990s saw an increasing 
effort to make sanctions ‘smarter’, that is, to target areas and even persons that are 
susceptible and in a position to bring about the changes sought by the relevant sanctions. 
The merits of this are twofold: not only does it make sanctions more effective, but it also 
renders them less harsh on a civilian population since the latter in principle is exempt from 
their effects.  
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The UNSC in its practice has targeted its sanctions in two ways: by introducing humanitarian 
exemptions and sector-specific measures. For example, sanctions against Sierra Leone were 
limited to an oil and arms embargo and restrictions on the travel of members of the military 
junta and in the Sudan a flight ban and restrictions on travel and diplomatic discourse were 
imposed312. The financial sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan beginning in 
1999 aimed at compelling that administration to turn over Osama bin Laden included an 
obligation for all States to freeze funds and other financial resources controlled directly or 
indirectly by the Taliban or their undertakings313. Thus, ‘tailored’ sanctions would seem to be 
a more appropriate word, since the sanctions are customized so as to hit the targeted 
authority where it hurts the most, in areas where they may have something to loose. This 
strategy equally seeks out regimes commanded by individuals indifferent to anything but 
personal gain. In addition to this, starting with its directing an arms embargo against 
Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000314, the UNSC has abided by a practice to include time limits 
when imposing sanctions315. 
 
Tailored sanctions would be biased in the case where they target the person(s) responsible 
for the impeding of humanitarian aid that are also part of a belligerent party. But due to the 
fact that these sanctions to their character force out an acceptance to that the aid is 
delivered, as opposed to armed force which merely physically ‘pushes the relief in’, they 
would not seem to menace the principle of neutrality in the same obvious way as does armed 
force (see below). 
 
At the initiative of the Swiss government a dialogue between experts and practitioners on 
targeted financial sanctions was started in Interlaken in 1998 (‘the Interlaken Process’) and, 
following that model, in mid-2000 the German Foreign Office commenced a process 
focused on arm embargoes, travel bans and aviation sanctions (‘the Bonn-Berlin Process’). 
These two processes presented practical suggestions and models of UN sanctions 
                                                 
312 Craven, op.cit., p.48 
313 S/RES/1267 of 15 October 1999 
314 S/RES/1298 of 7 February 2000 
315 Lutz Oette, “A Decade of Sanctions against Iraq: Never Again! The End of Unlimited Sanctions in the 
Recent Practice of the UN Security Council”, in European Journal if International Law, vol.13 no.1, p.93-103, at 
p.94. In the face of a most likely USA and UK veto in the UNSC against easening sanctions against Iraq in 
1998, France, Russia and China decided to always demand the inclusion of time limits in future sanction, as a 
matter of principle, see ibid. p.95. 
resolutions to the UNSC in October 2001. Finally, in 2001 the Swedish government began a 
project on how to maximize the effectiveness of targeted sanctions through thorough 
implementation (‘the Stockholm Process’). The Stockholm process delivered its Final Report 
to the UNSC on the 25th of February, 2003. 
 
The Bonn-Berlin Process suggested a formulation model for UNSC sanctions on arms 
embargos, containing inter alia:  
 
 Op 1 
Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply and transfer, or the promotion of 
facilitation of such sale, supply or transfer to (target states), by their nationals or from their territories, 
or using their flag vessels or aircraft of: 
 
(a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition; military, paramilitary 
and police vehicles and equipment; and spare parts and components for the aforementioned and 
equipment specifically designed for military or paramilitary purposes, whether or not originating in 
their territories; 
[…]316 
 
Materiel potentially targeted by the resolution, but with humanitarian use was exempted 
from the sanctions regime, subject to approval: 
 
 Op 4 
 Decides also that the measures imposed by Op 1 above shall not apply to: 
 […] 
(c) supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian use by other 
organizations, as approved in advance by the (Sanctions) Committee;317 
 
As have been noted earlier in this study, the true effectiveness of tailored sanctions will be 
depending on their proper and consistent implementation. To this effect the Final Report of 
the Stockholm Process lays down ten recommendations, crucial to an effective 
implementation, namely: 1) design sanctions resolutions with implementation in mind; 2) 
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maintain international support for the sanctions regime; 3) monitor, follow up and improve 
the measures throughout the sanctions regime; 4) strengthen the sanctions work of the UN 
Secretariat; 5) although different, much can be learned from the UN Counter-Terrorism 
Committee; 6) effective sanctions require capacity-building and training programs; 7) 
implementation can be enhanced through a model law; 8) implementation will vary 
depending on the type of sanctions; 9) maintaining accuracy in sanctions targeting is crucial; 
and 10) reporting on sanctions implementation318. 
 
Strictly implemented, tailored sanctions appear rather appealing in comparison to the use of 
armed force or comprehensive sanctions as a means to enforce humanitarian assistance. A 
risk, however, when discussing tailored sanctions is that the delight at the combination of 
effectiveness and humanitarianism of these strategic tools for the Council is blinding to the 
adverse direct and indirect effects they may still have. Especially as a weapon in the “war 
against terrorism” targeted sanctions have proven to infringe fundamental legal rights of 
individuals, such as the presumption of innocence and an accused individual’s right to access 
to court. For example, this was the case with the three Swedish citizens who – without any 
possibility to present a defense case or even challenge the decision against them – got their 
assets frozen pursuant to the financial sanctions targeted against the Taliban 
administration319. Moreover, albeit to a lesser extent than comprehensive ones, targeted 
sanctions may also have negative impacts on the civilian population at large, e.g. by creating 
economic hardships for individuals on the targeted market, by creating obstacles for medical 
supplies being delivered because the medicines may also form part of chemical weapons, 
(‘dual use’) or by boosting criminality and a black market. Finally, it must not be forgotten 
that international law and the UN Charter still constitute the base for the application of 
tailored sanctions. They remain a means of force under Art 41 of the Charter and as such 
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should not be seen as a universal remedy nor be applied in situations other than those 
envisaged by the Charter. 
 
Inasmuch as any potential adverse effects for the civilian population, notwithstanding their 
extent, similar to those produced by comprehensive sanctions equally would be the result of 
a tailored sanctions regime, an assessment of its legality should be conducted in line with 
what has been suggested above concerning comprehensive sanctions. The grounds for 
considering comprehensive sanctions illegal are just as applicable to tailored sanctions; as 
mentioned, the latter are not above international law. High standards of diligence could be 
required from the Council with respect to its awareness of tailored sanctions’ adverse effects 
for civilians in the light of earlier human disasters caused or worsened by its sanctions. In 
this context, it is noteworthy that when commenting on its recommendation 3) above (the 
monitoring of sanctions) the Final Report of the Stockholm Process calls on the UNSC to 
continue its efforts to improve the design and the management of humanitarian exemptions 
for third parties, whether States, entities, or individuals320. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs 
have recommended that routine pre-assessments and mid-course assessments as to the 
humanitarian impact of the relevant sanctions should be undertaken as an integral part of all 
sanctions regimes321. Concerning the first kind of evaluation, one being conducted prior to 
the imposition of a sanctions regime, the Final Report of the Stockholm Process argues that 
such undertakings may undermine the imposition of sanctions as they risk extending the 
period between the announcement of an intention to impose tailored sanctions and their 
actual imposition, thus providing an opportunity for targets to evade the sanctions322. It 
would seem that also the mere announcement as such could result in similar effects, 
although perhaps not risking as much evasion as tangible preparations to actually impose 
sanctions (which pre-assessments represent). Conversely, however, it might be argued that 
measures showing that the UNSC is ‘serious’ in its endeavors to put concrete action behind 
its demands might compel the targets without even having to impose the sanctions at all. In 
any case, pre-assessments would certainly minimize potential adverse humanitarian effects of 
tailored sanctions; as so often in the debate on sanctions the issue is one of humanitarianism 
                                                 
320 Ibid., para.32 
321 Ibid., para.33 
322 Ibid. 
versus efficiency. Concerning the second kind of assessment proposed – periodic evaluation 
of the humanitarian impacts during the course of sanctions implementation – it is endorsed 
by the Final Report of the Stockholm Process, not only due to its humanitarian benefits, but 
also seeing that such an assessment would be useful in distinguishing the impacts of 
sanctions from other causes of humanitarian suffering323. This would strengthen the 
legitimacy of tailored sanctions as they would be accordingly ameliorated and hopefully 
increasingly accepted by the civilian population of the affected State (c.f. above under 
Comprehensive sanctions on the problem of sanctions perceived as unjust and rallying 
people around targeted leaders against an evil outside world). The Final Report suggests that 
the periodic monitoring could be conducted by the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)324. 
 
Finally, a few remarks must be made in relation to the issues of potential humanitarian 
effects (and thus illegality) and monitoring of tailored sanctions. It has been discussed above 
whether the UNSC is bound by humanitarian law when exercising its powers under Chapter 
VII325. It was concluded that the Council perceives itself bound by at least some 
humanitarian norms in so doing (an evidence of which is the introduction of tailored 
sanctions) and that in any case it is not subject to judicial review. In the light of the human 
suffering imposed by UNSC sanctions historically, clarification on these matters would of 
course have to be among the issues considered when undertaking the above urged revision 
of the rules applicable to the UNSC so as to augment confidence in this institution and thus 
strengthen it. 
 
In sum, properly implemented and with due regard to the facts that they are neither self-
legalizing nor flawless, the potential effectiveness and relatively minor humanitarian impacts 
of tailored sanctions render them the most appealing alternative of forcible means to 
convince a responsible authority to accept humanitarian assistance. 
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Armed force 
 
According to Art 42 of the UN Charter the use of armed force by the UNSC is a secondary 
means of persuasion relatively measures not involving military action. This indicates the 
nature of armed force as being one of last resort when all other possible ways of solving a 
threat to international peace and security have been exhausted. 
 
The disadvantages of using armed force to implement humanitarian aid are first and 
foremost linked to the principle of neutrality and confidence for the humanitarian agents on 
the ground. The case of the forcible delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia illustrates how it 
may prove next to impossible for the enforcing agents to stay neutral to the armed conflict 
in which they operate since they would have to fight the belligerent(s) impeding the 
assistance326. Such involvement in the conflict will menace the local and perhaps also the 
international confidence in the enforcement action, risking to diminish the legitimacy of the 
entire humanitarian operation. A lack of legitimacy would moreover obstruct the efficiency 
of the humanitarian operation since the delivery of the relief will be further complicated if 
the very beneficiaries of the aid do not have trust in it. Should armed force prove to be the 
only way in which humanitarian assistance can be delivered, extreme care should therefore 
be taken to distinguish the humanitarian organizations from the enforcing agents so as to 
avoid that the distrust in the latter spills over to the former.  
 
As opposed to the effect targeted sanctions to some extent might have on affected leaders 
the use of armed force does not necessarily compel the authorities refusing the aid to revoke 
their standpoint, as it merely physically puts the assistance in place. Therefore, what was 
from the beginning envisaged as a ‘chirurgical’ task may in the end prove to be a lengthy and, 
both in terms of casualties and funding, costly enterprise for all parties. In order to 
accomplish their goal enforcers may find themselves forced to enlarge their mission to 
comprise also the leadership; as argued above, this may in fact be looked upon as a 
possibility by certain enforcing agents and a motivation for embarking on a ‘humanitarian’ 
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operation. At any rate, the enforcing agent runs the risk of becoming, or at least being 
perceived by a warring faction, as a party to the armed conflict – thus depriving it of its 
humanitarian nature – and even boosting a civil war by fighting fire with fire. Finally, the 
armed enforcement of humanitarian aid entails a violation of the affected authorities’ 
territory by the forces of other States, not explicitly provided for by the UN Charter. 
 
Supporting the use of armed force to implement humanitarian aid, however, is the fact that 
it may have a rather exclusive impact on the authority responsible for impeding the relief as 
opposed to at least comprehensive sanctions which predominantly affect the civilian 
population which is already suffering from that authority’s misdeeds. 
 
In conclusion, the use of armed force to implement humanitarian assistance might be 
considered as a last resort. In order for such an operation not to be illegitimate and thus 
inefficient, it will be imperative that its enforcing agents are distinguished from its 
humanitarian actors. 
 
Prevention 
 
It is also necessary to recognize that any armed intervention is itself a result of the failure of 
prevention327. 
 
The discussion of the distribution of humanitarian aid in this essay has been limited to the 
alleviation of urgent human suffering and has thus not been concerned with long-term 
ameliorations in the country of the victims – resulting in the potential prevention of future 
disasters – which admittedly often would be the best and most sustainable means to ease 
their hardships. Addressing these issues of course requires a profound comprehension of the 
conflict in which an armed conflict is raging, a quality that many NGOs and other 
organizations conducting long-lasting aid programs posses. However, there is a fine line 
between on the one hand understanding the “historical, social and economic fabric”328 of a 
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humanitarian crisis and adjusting one’s long-termed relief actions to it with an open mind 
and, on the other, imposing one’s own values and righteous lifestyle upon peoples of other 
cultures. Historically, the “dictatorship of the virtuous” has led to both inquisitions and 
witch-hunts329. The road to imperialism might be paved with good intentions if modern 
missionaries are acting as moral crusaders.  
 
When thus diligently reconciling potential unstable areas it would also be imperative for the 
actors undertaking these tasks to be utterly self-critical and to asses its own potential guilt in 
creating humanitarian hardship around the globe. Many in the West see misfortunes of the 
Third World as isolated abnormalities far from home, which can be swiftly solved through 
military force. Observing humanitarian crisis without self-criticism as isolated disasters, 
‘chirurgical’ military actions are easy to publicly justify. From a wider perspective, however, 
Third World countries have paid a high price for Western prosperity and wealth330. 
Prevention measures should therefore be under the auspices of and following negotiations 
within a multi-cultural organization representing the entire world community, such as the 
UN. 
 
In sum, seeing that humanitarian law is inherently short-minded and does not propose long 
term solutions to humanitarian crises (which are often long term problems), the institutions 
applying it must do so with a long term perspective and the above mentioned considerations 
in mind. 
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Conclusion 
 
The title of this essay poses the question whether there is a right to afford humanitarian 
assistance in non-international armed conflicts. The problem comes down in two sub-
questions: 1) are responsible authorities, which are often equally belligerents to an internal 
armed conflict, free to refuse humanitarian aid being delivered; and 2) in the negative, what 
are advisable ways of action to enable the delivery of the aid?  
 
To properly approach these questions, it is essential to understand the three fundamental 
principles defining humanitarian assistance. According to the principle of humanity, the aid 
must only be distributed on the sole criterion of need. The principle of impartiality requires 
that the assistance cannot be distributed on a discriminatory basis, e.g. on nationality, race or 
religious beliefs. The third principle – neutrality – stipulates that a relief action must never be 
integrated into a political process or linked to the use of military means. All these three 
principles serve the purpose of limiting the risks that humanitarian assistance is abused for 
other than humanitarian ends. An organization or relief action that fulfills the criteria of 
humanity, impartiality and neutrality is thus defined as humanitarian. Conversely, should it 
subsequently prove to be lacking any of these three conditions, the organization will seize to 
be humanitarian. 
 
The relevant humanitarian law instrument applicable to the refusal of humanitarian 
assistance in non-international armed conflicts, the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions, does not give any clear guidance on whether responsible authorities in these 
conflicts lawfully can deny humanitarian assistance being provided in all cases. On one hand, 
Art 18 of Additional Protocol II explicitly subjects the delivery of humanitarian relief to the 
consent of the warring parties, and States did envisage their sovereignty to be intact when 
negotiating that Protocol. On the other hand, in its commentary to Additional Protocol II, 
the International Conference of the Red Cross advocates an interpretation of Art 18 to the 
effect that responsible authorities must have valid grounds for refusing humanitarian aid. 
This view is supported by ICRC’s authoritative role on the humanitarian law scene and the 
fact that the international community have reacted to enforce humanitarian aid. The 
hindering of or attacks upon humanitarian relief could also constitute the actus reus of several 
international crimes as defined by the Rome Statute, e.g. starvation and crimes against 
humanity. Should an obligation of responsible authorities not to arbitrarily refuse 
humanitarian aid be affirmed, it would result in a corresponding right for civilians to receive 
humanitarian assistance. It must be noted, however, that this right – and it is the view of this 
essay that individuals indeed can possess rights under humanitarian law – would be under 
humanitarian law, not under human rights law. Seeing that a humanitarian organization per 
definition would be neutral and according to international law not engaging in unlawful 
behavior when distributing assistance, it seems reasonable that a right of access to the 
victims is conferred upon humanitarian organizations as the link through which the 
responsible authority’s obligation and the victims’ rights can be realized. 
 
Although the first sub-question is of fundamental principal interest as legitimizing an 
enforcement action for humanitarian aid, the pressing part of the issue of a right to afford 
humanitarian aid will be the second sub-question, i.e. the procedure for enabling 
humanitarian assistance to reach the needy when refused. Both the United Nations as well as 
coalitions of States unilaterally has namely taken forceful measures under humanitarian 
pretexts but without a clear legal framework for these actions. What has therefore been 
argued throughout this essay is the need for stringency in defining the cases when 
humanitarian aid may be forcibly implemented as well as deciding upon what actions should 
then be taken. Concerning States as enforcement agents, this should be done to the effect 
that they do not find themselves with arguments for unilateral humanitarian intervention. As 
far as the UN is concerned, it should be done in order to strengthen the Organization’s 
legitimacy. In light of the current state of world affairs, hosting one superpower that does 
not show much hesitation before unilaterally bending clear rules of international law to 
pursue its own national interests (e.g. the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003), and because of 
the fact that enforcement of humanitarian assistance may actually unleash the use of force, it 
is particularly urgently needed to clarify the legal framework for humanitarian operations. 
 
It has been noted that the enforcement of humanitarian assistance may form part of an 
enterprise of humanitarian intervention. The present essay does not side with the view that 
there is an inconsistency between sovereignty and morality that legitimizes unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. Instead, it has been argued that State sovereignty – wing-clipped 
through the prohibition of the unilateral use of force other than for self-defense and 
subjected in part to peaceful forums – in fact supports the moral value of international peace 
and stability. This suggestion finds its grounds in a realistic conviction that States do not 
possess altruistic qualities to outweigh their pursuit of national interests and are thus not 
well-suited for the task of deciding upon when to use force, as opposed to an organization 
with the purpose of achieving international peace and which represents the world 
community such as the UN.  
 
Adding to the problem of enforcing humanitarian assistance is the inherent lack of neutrality 
in an armed implementation action. As several examples treated in this paper have shown, 
such an action would be nearly inherently biased in non-international armed conflicts. This is 
due to the fact that it would take place only when the relevant authority refuses the aid to be 
delivered and ultimately, the action would necessitate certain forceful measures being 
directed at that authority in order to compel it to allow for the humanitarian assistance to be 
delivered. Thus, in cases when it boils down to implementing humanitarian assistance by 
armed force, such action could almost never be neutral to the internal armed conflict in 
which the relief was to be given. In order for such non-neutrality not to imbrue the 
humanitarian organizations, these should be clearly distinguished from the enforcing agents. 
The reason for this distinction is that a strict upholding of humanitarian organizations’ 
neutrality diminishes the risk that they be exploited for non-humanitarian causes.  
 
The following three core issues pertaining to the right to afford humanitarian assistance have 
thus been perceived by the present paper: 1) the lack of clear rules on when humanitarian 
relief is being unlawfully refused (if it indeed can be) combined with the fact that an 
enforcement action of it could still entail the use of force; 2) the general problem of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention; and 3) the unavoidable lack of neutrality of an armed 
enforcement action. Any of these three problems alone would raise concerns of its potential 
misuse; together and in combination with a possibility to use force they seem combustible to 
that effect. Unclear rules can and will always be used as legitimizing the actions of the 
interpreter, in the present case as another argument for unilateral humanitarian intervention, 
a concept which does not benefit from a general international acceptance and which 
endangers international peace. The deployment of non-neutral ‘humanitarian’/enforcement 
agents would open the gate to operations under humanitarian flag for clandestine purposes 
and it would menace the confidence in humanitarian organizations, not only in the material 
armed conflict but also on a general, global level.  
 
A few modest suggestions have been made in this study to overcome these issues. 
 
1) and 2): Elaboration of clear rules and UN legitimacy 
Firstly, clear rules would have to be elaborated331, and existing ones clarified, on the 
questions by whom, when and how a forceful action to implement humanitarian aid could 
be undertaken in situations when it is being refused by the responsible authority in a non-
international armed conflict. This would particularly include a revision of the rules applicable 
to the UNSC when exercising its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (e.g. to 
explicitly clarify whether the Council may deploy force to pursue purely humanitarian ends 
and desirably that it is bound by humanitarian law in so doing as well as to review the veto-
powers). It would be reaffirmed in the revision that the UNSC is the only body with the 
power to authorize the use of force and this should be reiterated with respect to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, e.g. by adapting the Charter’s rules so as to enable the UN to 
answer rapidly to crisis of the contemporary world. Such a revision would be undertaken 
with the view of strengthening the legitimacy of the UN system which would also lessen the 
arguments for unilateral humanitarian intervention.  
 
In order for the UNSC to have a sound, non-political and legal basis for its decisions on 
whether an enforcement action should be conducted or not, it has been suggested that the 
ICC be given an advisory role as to whether humanitarian aid is being unlawfully impeded in 
a certain situation. This would contribute to a consistent elaboration of the clear rules called 
for above freed from political concerns, which would thus profit from predictability, 
stringency and neutrality. It would also enhance the legitimacy of UNSC action. 
 
                                                 
331 The Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance elaborated by the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law in 1993 is a remarkable effort in this context, and could be the platform for negotiations on 
a treaty on the issue. Basic regulations on the character on an enforcement enterprise are given in Principles 6-8 
and 11, e.g. that the UNSC should decide upon such actions (Principle 7). 
Subject to their trust in the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, it has been recommended 
that States be encouraged to give interpretative declarations to Additional Protocol II to 
clarify their standpoint on the issue of whether delivery of humanitarian aid requires consent 
from the responsible authority and/or to enter into treaties to the same effect. 
 
Arguably, the best means for sustainable alleviation of the suffering of civilians would be 
long-term ameliorations in their countries, preventing future armed conflicts. Such measures 
would however have to be executed with the greatest diligence so as to avoid value-
imperialism, which is why a multi-cultural organization such as the UN is well-suited for this 
task. 
 
3): Targeted sanctions 
The use of armed force has been envisaged as the very last means of implementation for 
humanitarian aid. Instead, and opposed to comprehensive sanctions, the use of tailored 
sanctions has been embraced as a means to forcefully persuade responsible authorities to 
accept humanitarian assistance, when other non-forcible measures have failed. Tailored 
sanctions would be biased in the case where they target the person(s) responsible for the 
impeding of humanitarian aid that are also part of a belligerent party. But due to the fact that 
these sanctions to their character force out an acceptance to that the aid is delivered, as 
opposed to armed force which merely physically ‘pushes the relief in’, they would not seem 
to menace the principle of neutrality in the same obvious way as does armed force. 
 
However, it must not be forgotten that targeted sanctions still remain a measure of force 
activated by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter, and that, in view of the 
devastating humanitarian consequences UN comprehensive sanctions have had in the past, 
high standards of diligence should be requested from the Council as to the adverse effects 
(e.g. legal security of the individual) targeted sanctions may still have. Regular monitoring of 
both their effectiveness and their humanitarian impacts must therefore be made in order to 
gain legitimacy for their imposition. 
 
 
 
It must be borne in mind that a forceful implementation of humanitarian aid may unleash 
the use of armed force. This is an extremely sensitive subject. One of the greatest 
accomplishments of the 20th century and the very raison d’être of the UN is the submission of 
the use of force to a peaceful forum based on State sovereignty. Without adjusting and 
legitimizing them as suggested in the preceding paragraphs, obscurities in existing rules 
pertaining to the right to afford humanitarian assistance in non-international armed conflicts 
will continue to offer irresistible opportunities for ambitious States to invoke their side of 
the truth to exploit the possibility to embark on military enterprises. Certain States have 
already seized such occasions. The consequences of a continuance of this trend will in the 
end through war fall back on civilians – the supposed beneficiaries of a right to afford 
humanitarian assistance. 
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